Iran vs. Israel

[Nightwatch]

Jaja, und so wird aus ein paar alten MiG-21 ein ganzes Sammelsurium von Flugzeugen.
Aus deinen Links:

It was a great excercise.........but the USAF played smart here by playing dumb at times to give the IAF an edge at times and thus making them expose their tactics for the kill as well as ESM data about the radars of the BISON (Kopyo) and Su30k (Noo1)......well hence the press reports stating IAF overkill can be viewed in this light as well.....good show USAF...and the IAF

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He declined to discuss classified results of the exercise but said, "Something like Cope India, when we find that some of our advantages aren't as great as we thought they might be, leads me to remind people that we need to modernize our air-to-air capability." Gen Hornburg said the results of the exercise showed the need for the F/A-22 Raptor and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

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Surprise, Surprise...

Das - im Ernstfall sicher nicht existierende - Fehlen von AWACS bzw. die gewohnheitsmäßige Ausrichtung darauf war in der Duellsituation tatsächlich fatal.

[...]

beabsichtigter Effekt könnte aber in Wahrheit der Ruf nach früheren und nach mehr F/A-22s sein - deren Kongressmittel sprudeln nicht so, wie sich die USAF das wünscht. Hat man also die Elmendorf-Drivers tatsächlich zum Verlieren und Raptor-"Pushen" hingeschickt (?) - dann könnte das aufgegangen sein. Senior USAF-Leaders begründen den Ausgang der Übung gegen die Inder als Beweis dass "es eben Zeit für die nächste Generation" ist. Schon hört man Stimmen die "nur 276 F/A-22s" als viel zu wenig kritisieren

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Und mal wirklich im Detail:

1) Equipment

a) The Indian SU-30 Flankers's are Russian F-15 analogs, air superiority fighters, with French electronics. The F-16s, in contrast, are multi-role strike fighters. The Flanker was designed after the F-16 was with the full intelligence the KGB provided on the to Soviet Design bureaus. The Flankers have bigger diameter radomes for the air superiority mission so their radars will see the F-16s sooner than the F-16s will see them given equivalent vintage electronics.

b) Russian Su-30's have long-range infrared search and track telescopes so the Su-30's would have visual engagement at longer-range than F-16s, which lack them. (Those sites are standard equipment for the under development F35.) This means the Flankers can engage with their Russian made AA-11 Archer infra red dogfight missiles sooner than the F-16s can with their Sidewinders.

c) The Russians sell their Su-30's with A-11 Archer off bore sight dogfight missiles and helmet-mounted sites. The USAF hasn't yet achieved full deployment of its AIM-9X Super Sidewinders with the equivalent helmet mounted site on F-16s. I suspect the F-16s involved in Cope India 2005 did not have these toys.

2) Doctrine

a) The rules of engagement (ROE) were all within visual range. The USAF avoids visual range air-to-air combat if it can help it. This is because exercises have shown that two modern fighters with well trained pilots, modern off bore sight dog fight missiles and helmet mounted sights to aim them tend to commit mutual suicide when they come in visual range of one another. The ground combat ditty "That you can see you can hit, and what you can hit you can kill" applies in spades to visual air combat.

b) The USAF F-16s are almost all Link 16 and AIM-120 Slammer equipped. USAF BVR engagements with AWACS are now increasingly data and not voice. In this exercise the AWACs were "neutral" and gave voice only instruction to both sides pilots. The Indians are trained regularly to use to ground based voice controlled intercepts. The F-16s pilots were less well trained at this.

c) Air to mud is the primary training mode for F-16 jocks due to wartime demands and USAF operation budget driven training hour�s cuts. The air-to-air training the F-16s do get concentrates on the most likely air-to-air combat the USAF intends to use -- BVR engagements with full AWACS digital support. The upshot is that in Cope India 2005 the F-16s were not using their primary air-to-air training to engage the Indians.

d) The USAF does not fight "Fair." When the USAF shows up to air to air combat with lethal intent, as opposed to international exercises, it also shows up witht the full panoply of electromagnetic combat capabilities. The non-US side of any air-to-air combat will have difficulty establishing radio communications between aircraft sections, let alone the command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) necessary for ground controlled or AWAC controlled intercepts.

So lets sum up the implications here. The Indian Su-30's were operating within their services training and doctrine to full equipment capability -- which exceeded that of the F-16 in the air-to-air role.

While the F-16s were not using their best equipment and were operating on back up air-to-air procedures that were outside the majority of their training. Nor were they operating with the full combat support environment they use in war.

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Steht alles drin, man muss es nur lesen.

ist mir jetzt direkt peinlich - aber die alte MiG-21 wird von den Iranern auch geflogen :oops:

Peinlich ist dein Auftreten hier. Du hast die komplett in dem Wahn verrannt die Iranern könnten der USAF aufgrund von Manövern gegen die indische Luftwaffe irgendetwas entgegensetzen.
Das ist in der Tat zu schämen.