Krieg im 21. Jahrhundert
#16
(17.05.2021, 19:54)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Wenn man mal die ethisch/moralische Seite außer Acht lässt, dann muss man umgekehrt zu der zwingenden Schlußfolgerung kommen, dass vollautonome Systeme im nächsten Krieg ein erheblicher Vorteil sein werden.

Die Macht welche diesen Vorteil rücksichtslos und ohne Bedenken so weitgehend wie möglich exploriert, wird damit erhebliche militärische Vorteile erzielen.
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Das große Unbehagen einer Mehrheit der Menschen in Bezug auf diese Technologie zeigt erst recht die militärische Wirksamkeit auf und wie hervorragend gerade diese Systeme in der Abschreckung sind.

Die Frage, ob derartige Systeme massive Vorteil bringen, dürfte klar sein. Ebenfalls die Notwendigkeit, sie in der modernen Kriegsführung zu verwenden. Offen bleibt für mich allerdings, wie man mit dieser Erkenntnis umgeht:

Man kann man diesen Vorteil unbegrenzt für sich nutzen. Das wäre wohl das militärisch effizienteste.
Oder man zieht eine ethische rote Linie. Dann müssen wir uns natürlich bewusst machen, dass Gegner auf uns zu kommen werden, die solche roten Linien nicht ziehen. Wenn wir also aus moralisch-ethischen Gründen unsere rote Linie halten wollen, dann können wir das nur überstehen, wenn wir einen Weg finden, die "ungehemmt"-autonomen Systeme derart zu kontern, dass sie eben keinen entscheidenden Vorteil mehr bringen.
Somit könnte die Entwicklung von "Counter-AI"-Technologien existenziell werden für Gesellschaften, die sich ihre moralischen Grundsätze bewahren wollen.
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#17
Da der Krieg als Entinität seiner Natur nach immer zum totalen Krieg hin strebt wird in jedem Krieg über kurz oder lang jede rote Linie fallen, und damit auch alle moralischen Grundsätze, zumal Krieg in sich selbst vollkommen unmoralisch ist. Die Idee eines moralischen Krieges ist daher absurd, da Krieg in seinem innersten Kern nichts anderes ist als andere Menschen in Massen zu ermorden damit die Überlebenden gehorchen und sich dem eigenen Willen unterwerfen.

Meiner Ansicht nach muss daher jede Counter-AI Technologie allein schon deshalb nachteilig sein, weil sie dem Wesen der Dinge entgegen läuft. Daher ist für mich eher Abschreckung der Lösungsansatz. Man müsste selbst solche Systeme in ausreichender Anzahl vorhalten und eine entsprechende Abschreckung dadurch schaffen.

Meiner Meinung nach führt aber auch am Besitz von Massenvernichtungswaffen nichts vorbei. Auch Deutschland benötigt eigentlich zwingend Massenvernichtungswaffen in nicht unerheblichem Umfang. Über die völlige politische Unmöglichkeit brauchen wir hier gar nicht erst anfangen, es geht nur um die reine Theorie. Unter dem Deckmantel entsprechender Abwehrprogramme könnte man zudem solche Technologie voran bringen und anfangs als rein defensive Maßnahme tarnen.

Man könnte daher auch entsprechende Vollautonome Waffensysteme unter dem Deckmäntelchen einer Counter-AI Technologie erforschen, mit einer solchen geheimen Agenda dahinter würde das also dann schon Sinn machen.

Auf jeden Fall hängen wir in diesem für den nächsten Krieg vermutlich entscheidenden Bereich derart dramatisch zurück, dass dieser Missstand im Laufe der nächsten Dekaden immer größere Probleme hervor rufen wird und wir uns zunehmend politisch anderen Mächten werden unterordnen müssen.
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#18
(17.05.2021, 21:03)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Daher ist für mich eher Abschreckung der Lösungsansatz. Man müsste selbst solche Systeme in ausreichender Anzahl vorhalten und eine entsprechende Abschreckung dadurch schaffen.

Diese deine Meinung war mir natürlich klar. Und ich wollte ihr explizit etwas entgegen stellen.

(17.05.2021, 21:03)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Da der Krieg als Entinität seiner Natur nach immer zum totalen Krieg hin strebt wird in jedem Krieg über kurz oder lang jede rote Linie fallen, und damit auch alle moralischen Grundsätze, zumal Krieg in sich selbst vollkommen unmoralisch ist.
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Man könnte daher auch entsprechende Vollautonome Waffensysteme unter dem Deckmäntelchen einer Counter-AI Technologie erforschen, mit einer solchen geheimen Agenda dahinter würde das also dann schon Sinn machen.

Als halbwegs realistische Option würde ich hierzu so etwas wie ein "Tabula-Rasa-Protokoll" sehen. Also die ungehemmte Entwicklung vollautonomer Systeme, die jedoch so lange durch z.B. man-in-the-loop-Verfahren kontrolliert werden, bis der Krieg zum von dir beschriebenen Fall der roten Linie geführt hat. Das wäre mit der atomaren Abschreckung vergleichbar: Ein Waffensystem, das wir aus vielen verschiedenen Gründen niemals verwenden wollen, aber trotzdem vorhalten. Für Deutschland unwahrscheinlich, aber unsere atomar-bestückten Partner dürften auch damit kein größeres Problem haben.
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#19
https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/irregu...-world-war

Zitat:An interview with Admiral (Retired) James Stavridis and Elliot Ackerman

"What would a conflict with China look like? How will irregular warfare fit into a conflict before and during large-scale combat operations? Retired Admiral James Stavridis and Elliot Ackerman join this episode of the Irregular Warfare Podcast to discuss the theme of escalation to large-scale conflict, which they explore in their New York Times best seller 2034: A Novel of the Next World War

In answering those questions, they emphasize the nature of human behavior in conflict and how escalation can get out of control.

The novel follows the escalation of the next world war, beginning in the South China Sea. In the episode, the authors explain several key contributions that special operations forces would make in the type of conflict their novel imagines. They argue that a crucial advantage the United States has is its close relationships with partners and allies in the region—relationships that special operations forces foster before conflict—and that these forces’ direct-action capabilities will be invaluable during conflict. While both guests make clear that the book is a work of fiction, it is a cautionary tale for policymakers on how escalation could lead to a nuclear conflict."

https://mwi.usma.edu/irregular-warfare-i...world-war/

Ebenfalls recht gut und in dieser Richtung:

https://mwi.usma.edu/introducing-the-irr...nitiative/

https://mwi.usma.edu/irregular-versus-co...onception/

https://mwi.usma.edu/toward-a-whole-of-s...formation/

Und über mein Lieblingsthema: das Primat der Kultur vor allem anderen:

https://mwi.usma.edu/will-culture-defeat...-and-iraq/
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#20
Über Urbane Kriegsführung:

https://mwi.usma.edu/urban-warfare-project/

Zitat:In the future, I can say with very high degrees of confidence, the American Army is probably going to be fighting in urban areas. We need to man, organize, train and equip the force for operations in urban areas, highly dense urban areas, and that’s a different construct. We’re not organized like that right now.

Gerade in Bezug auf Großstädte aufwärts werden zunehmend die Grenzen zwischen Krieg, assymetrischen Krieg, Terrorismus, organisierter Kriminalität, zwischen Frieden und Krieg an sich verwischt.

Es stellt sich daher die Frage, wie man auf diese Entwicklung reagieren sollte? Dazu tritt meiner Meinung nach als entscheidendes Element die Frage unserer sozialkulturellen Grundströmung. Das ganze wird damit auch zu einer Henne-Ei Frage. Verwischen die Grenzen aufgrund der Ausrichtung unserer Kultur oder kann unsere Kultur nur deshalb nicht mit diesen Umständen umgehen weil sie so ist wie nun einmal ist?

Wenn man sich für ein bestimmtes Ziel in diesem Kontext entscheidet, dann muss man eigentlich auch die sich zwingend daraus ergebenden Konsequenzen tragen. Genau das aber wollen wir hier und heute nicht mehr. Ist daher die Verwischung der Grenzen zwischen Krieg und Frieden nicht schlußendlich nur ein Resultat aus unserer zu weitgehend ritualisierten Kriegsführung?

Ist der Kampf in Städten überhaupt ein Problem, insbesondere der assymetrische Konflikt, wäre unsere Kriegsführung nicht derart ritualisiert?!

Eine Buchempfehlung in diesem Kontext:

https://smallwarsjournal.com/books/blood...megacities

Hab ich gerade erst durchgelesen, ein wirklich dicker Wälzer.
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#21
Ent-Digitalisierung

Eine Fragestellung die mich seit Jahren umtreibt ist die, ob für den nächsten größeren Krieg nicht eine bewusste Ent-Digitaliserung zwingend notwendig wäre. Den Begriff möchte ich dabei nicht allein auf das Militär begrenzt verstehen, da im Krieg das Militärische und das Zivile so eng zusammen hängen, dass ein Angriff auf die (digitale) Infrastruktur des Zivilen sehr rasche den totalen Zusammenbruch und dem folgend das Kriegsende zur Folge hätte.

Die Frage die ich also aufwerfen möchte ist: Sollten wir im Zivilen Bereich bestimmte Gebiete so weitgehend wie möglich Ent-Digitalisieren und sollten wir im militärischen so weit wie möglich Nicht-Digitale Strukturen schaffen und diese parallel zu den Digitalen Strukturen vorhalten?
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#22
Es ist wichtig die Pioniertechnik des Gegners zu zerstören, da ihre Anzahl begrenzt und zudem verwundbarer als Kampfgerät ist.

Diese simple Einsicht für Grenadiere/Infanteristen ist die leicht fassbare Version an Gefährdung, der jede Technik ausgesetzt ist, wenn sie ein Mindestmaß an Bedeutung überschreitet. Das heißt, ab einem bestimmten Grad an Relevanz wird die Waffe selbst zum Ziel.

Bewußt dramatisch ausgedrückt: Die Digitalisierung begann als Waffe, vor der sich jeder fürchten muß, und endet nun als Zielscheibe, die sich fürchten muß.

Übrigens, ein nuklear-elektromagnetischer Impuls würde mit einem Schlag die chinesische Marine zur Weltmacht machen.
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#23
Eigentlich seit Vietnam nichts neues, aber der Untergrund von Vietnam wird morgen schon überall sein:

Zitat:During the recent outbreak of fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, many of the Israeli strikes targeted Hamas tunnels. That raises a range of important questions. What advantages do subterranean environments lend to combatants? What military challenges do tunnels pose? More broadly, why is underground warfare occurring increasingly frequently? Dr. Richemond-Barak discusses these and other questions about the subterranean dimension of urban warfare.

https://mwi.usma.edu/underground-warfare...-and-gaza/
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#24
https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/kill-t...ttlefield/

Kill the Homothetic Army: Gen. Guy Hubin’s Vision of the Future Battlefield

Weiß jemand wo es die Bücher dieses Autors auf Englisch gibt?

https://www.amazon.de/Perspectives-tacti...3%95%C3%91&dchild=1&keywords=guy+hubin&qid=1623264225&sr=8-3

https://www.amazon.de/guerre-Une-vision-...3%95%C3%91&dchild=1&keywords=guy+hubin&qid=1623264225&sr=8-1
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#25
Ein paar Auszüge:

Zitat:Game Changers

Hubin identifies in Perspectives tactiques three specific new capabilities new technologies brought about that he believes are changing warfare profoundly: the ability to know precisely and in real time where all of one’s own forces are, the ability to fire without stopping, and precision indirect fires.

Knowing where everyone is gives one an unprecedented ability to fine-tune economy of means. It also facilitates dispersion: There is less need to group together to facilitate communication or avoid friendly fire incidents. Meanwhile, not having to stop to fire, according to Hubin, means, obviously, that one can keep moving, which is a growing imperative in the age of precise fires. It also undermines the linearity that historically has characterized battle: Stopping to aim and fire as either an attacker or a defender means taking up a fixed position relative to the adversary, and a typical maneuver is to have some troops fix the enemy while others attempt to go around or behind it. Now there is a front, a flank, and a rear. There is an axis of movement. Polarity. If one can keep moving, there is much less need to assume a fixed position relative to the adversary and, therefore, much less linearity or polarity. This also means, Hubin points out, that the two sides are more likely to get mixed up together. (Hubin uses the word imbrication, which, in English, is mostly reserved for geology to describe overlapping deposits or rocks.)

Meanwhile, precision indirect fires have several implications. They encourage and facilitate dispersion, because one can hit any target within range regardless of where one is, and because concentration has become increasingly hazardous. Also, as with the ability to shoot on the move, precision fires undermine linearity, with important implications for how forces are arranged in geographic space and how they move. Until recently, Hubin explains, the approach has been for some troops to move forward to engage and destroy the enemy, while others stay behind in the rear to support the forward troops. “In war as in love,” Hubin writes, citing Napoleon, “one has to get close.” This reinforces the polarity evident in tactics and maneuver, for there is a front, a back, and an axis of movement. Commanders arranged their subordinates accordingly, with bodies on the move accompanied by flanking units, van guards, and rearguards. Precision indirect fires, however, inverts the relationship. Combat forces’ job now is to find the enemy and, ideally, concentrate the enemy’s forces so they can be destroyed by indirect fires, which, from now on, will do the killing. This implies a weaker degree of polarity, especially if one assumes imbrication.

Another ramification of precision indirect fires has to do with logistics: The intrinsic inaccuracy of indirect fires in the past — especially against moving targets — has meant that achieving desired effects usually requires large quantities of ammunition. This, in turn, has required a massive logistical umbilical cord that limits maneuver and reinforces polarity with respect to the existence of a front, a back, and an axis of movement. Units break that cord at their peril. The French word for this cord is the noria, which refers to the chain of trucks or other vehicles that go back and forth to keep forward units supplied. Against the noria, Hubin contrasts the idea of “pulsation.” Logistics will “pulse” needed material as needed, when and where it is needed. Pulsation implies discontinuity, which normally would mean the death of the noria system and, ultimately, of ground maneuver, but now the point is to shed linearity and free up maneuver.

These new capabilities, combined with the growing danger to any concentration of forces even at the company scale, tend to push down the size of maneuver units. Smaller units at lower echelons will become more important than larger and higher ones. Platoons with two or three patrols will have the role battalions once did. As the pawns get smaller, Hubin argues, at some point, the integration of combined arms — which, in the French army, currently does at the company-level with the Combined Arms Tactical Subgroup — also has to stop. Integration below the Combined Arms Tactical Subgroup will have to give way to cooperation. Different elements will act to achieve the same goal, just not necessarily within the same unit.

Hubin uses homothety to describe the structure of different ground force units at different echelons (i.e., division, brigade, company, etc.), their relationship to one another in space, and also their relationship to a fixed point. Each echelon is a dilation of the same form, and each is homothetic in relation to a fixed point, i.e., a single point of command and control at which all lines ultimately converge, and also a fixed space within which units operate. Homothety denotes fixity or rigidity of shape (though not scale), of command and control structure, and of the physical area of operation.

Naturally, multi-domain operations requires a more horizontal flow of information and more flexible lines of communication. Hubin, however, wants to go further. Hubin wants to break the rigidity both of the shapes of army units and of their physical relationship with one another, more specifically their homothetic relationship relative to a fix point, and, likewise, the fixed area within which each echelon operates. Armies will need to be able to adjust who is subordinate to whom, create or suppress levels of responsibility, and permanently adapt the size and maneuver space of a given echelon. The “rectilinear shapes” of brigades and battalions are “inherently constraining” and no longer necessary, so armies had best be willing to back away from them. Everything must be fluid. The only predefined structure that will remain, he writes, is the platoon, the artillery piece, and the “engineering group.” Sometimes, several of these will be grouped together. Likewise, subordination will have to be flexible. One will see an armored unit engage under the orders of one commander but then pass under the command of another six hours later and end up under the orders of a third the next day.

One of the problems Hubin sees with the homothetic system is that, to a considerable degree, the commanders at the division, regiment, and company level are responsible for the same tasks of “conception,” “conduct,” and “execution.” This already has become problematic. Division-level commanders have little to do with the conduct of operations, and company-level commanders are too busy to do anything beyond execution, and, more often than not, they have to rely on instinct. Most interesting is the fate of the captain, which Hubin aligns with the “group” level, meaning the battalion-level combined arms tactical group. “The group conceives in haste and can only conduct,” Hubin writes, “which means to organize, coordinate, and articulate the means in space and time and monitor the coherence of the action.” But now that warfare is becoming more decentralized, and combat is increasingly the affair of small echelons, the system is losing all of its coherence. There needs to be a new division of labor, one that has nothing to do with the legacy hierarchy of the homothetic system, i.e., divisions/brigades, regiments, and companies, and is built entirely around the functions of conception, conduct, and execution.

Hubin proposes three levels of “tactical organization,” which he lays out in chapter 10 of Perspectives, but is related most succinctly in a clarifying email to the author. One is in charge of “maneuver conception,” which, he explained, “is to say to imagine, create and define what we call the idea of maneuver.” Another level is in charge of execution, “that is to say in charge of the fight with their equipment.” “At this level,” Hubin explains, “we will find patrols of armored, infantry, engineers’ group, artillery observation teams, etc.” Between these two levels, Hubin continues:

I propose to create an original system to control zones of maneuver to be sure that the different tactical pawns fighting in his zone work toward the aim defined by the conception level, i.e. to organize the different movements in his area, to allow an effective circulation of information, to organize what I call logistic rendezvous, and mainly to watch over the safety of the tactical pawns. What is brand new, is that this level is not linked to a tactical structure (platoon, company, battalion) but is attached to a portion of terrain on which the maneuver is evolving. In a way, ground tactical organization will draw nearer to air control organization.

Hubin imagines small units moving around the battlespace passing from the control of different commanders, each responsible for specific zones and responsible for coordinating activities and also providing resupply, in conformity with the objective determined by the “conception echelon.” Units in their space will associate with each other temporarily and flexibly. Implied here is the idea of abandoning traditional correlations between a commander’s rank and the degree of authority and responsibility.

“One must break the existing relationship,” he writes, “between the importance of the level of responsibility and the volume of the subordinates.” Hubin argues that such a radical transformation is necessary to derive from the new technologies their full benefit. Training and Doctrine Command, in comparison, comes close to this idea by arguing for granting to “the lowest appropriate echelon” authority to access support from across the range of “domains,” such as intelligence from national surveillance assets, and certainly fires from joint capabilities to which normally only higher echelons might have ready access.

For a long time, Hubin explains, maneuver was about hiding the bulk of one’s force (the gros), its location, and its intentions. Where was it going? Much of maneuver was about hiding this for as long as possible so as to benefit from some measure of surprise. Meanwhile, opposing commanders have to deduce the answers and, ultimately, gamble. In the future, according to Hubin, this will be more difficult to do because of all the sensors. The challenge will be less getting information than processing it.

This does not mean, however, that surprise will be impossible. Hubin uses the analogy of chess players: Both can see exactly where all the pieces are, yet it is still possible to surprise one’s opponent. The surprises are intellectual. “Surprise is realized by he who has the best vision of the situation, he who grasps the soonest and with the most clarity what is happening, and who knows how to coordinate the apparently incoherent action of his pieces such that the adversary remains eaten by doubt and does not know what move to make.” In any case, nowadays, even the idea of having a gros is questionable to the extent that it implies concentration. Maneuver, in fact, will have “inverted objectives.” Hubin explains that “the goal” of maneuver” will be “maintaining the dilution of one’s forces while obtaining the concentration of those of the enemy in order to give ground-to-ground indirect fires and air-to-ground fires better results.”

Hubin’s vision of the future battlefield has implications for the evolution of command style. Because of the impossibility of knowing how the enemy will react to what one does, he explains, the French army has always taught the imperative of trusting one’s gut. Decide, and decide fast. Of course, he notes, this is a bit like playing Russian roulette. Guessing right can determine whether or not one will be a national hero or a disgrace. This will change: The quantity of data and current and future computing power makes it increasingly possible to run models and simulations and quickly come up with something close to objective answers. That said, Hubin does not stray far from Foch and the French army’s emphasis on initiative and the offensive spirit. According to Hubin, initiative will count more than ever. One has to keep moving, which means one has to be the one with the initiative. Otherwise, one is finished. Part of that involves “resolution,” which Hubin thinks is necessary for risking the intermixing of one’s forces. You want to be inside the enemy’s formations, not the other way around.

Hubin, consistent with French doctrine, is pushing the mandate for initiative down to junior officers and noncommissioned officers in a context in which he does not expect unit structures to be relevant. Hubin’s junior commanders need to be able to stride boldly among the hosts of the enemy and place their trust in others they very likely will not know. He admits that this presents a profound challenge for unit cohesion. Historically combat units have preserved cohesion through proximity (ideally by remaining within sight of everyone else) and bonds of familiarity and trust. One fights shoulder-to-shoulder with those one knows and those with whom one has trained. Units also have striven to maintain lines of communication and support. Meanwhile, they would do everything possible to break the cohesion of opposing forces, which Hubin notes is a far better objective than seeking to destroy them materially. On the modern battlefield, proximity is dangerous, and, in fact, the situation in many ways is reversed: The better a force can operate physically scattered and mixed up with the adversary, the more likely it is to succeed.

On the future battlefield, the concentration of efforts will lose importance and become almost impossible to the extent that it is synonymous with the physical concentration of resources. Economy of force will take on new importance and also be conducted differently. The more units “can adjust rapidly, frequently, and fleetingly, the better will be their chances of success.”

All War is Asymmetrical

Hubin’s arguments about economy of forces leads him to a powerful idea, one that, as we shall see, gives him an edge relative to multi-domain operations: Strategy in the kind of conventional warfare Hubin envisions is similar to the strategy required for waging asymmetrical warfare, particularly as Beaufre described it. Beaufre had written that, in asymmetrical warfare, the insurgent needs to understand that a “decision” cannot be sought in battle — where any concentration of means is suicide — but rather through an “external maneuver.” This means, for example, shaping public opinion abroad or, in general, using whatever levers of power one might have at one’s disposal other than military force to limit the adversary’s liberty of action and obtain an advantage. One must not focus on the tactical fight — wherein the objective is simply to hold on — but instead focus on the strategic level. This means, for the asymmetrical commander, “no axial maneuver, no arrows on a map, and no mass to dissimulate, but on the contrary an isotropic maneuver concerning the entire zone of action.” More importantly, it also means that the entire military campaign is subordinate to non-military maneuvers such as information warfare, psychological warfare, and the whole panoply of things one does to hem in the adversaries’ liberty of action. Correspondingly, this is where the counter-insurgent, the one seeking to defeat an asymmetrical campaign, also needs to focus.

Hubin is arguing that the above description of a correct asymmetrical strategy matches his description of how future conventional battles will be fought. This implies that, instead of seeking decision on the battlefield, future commanders will have to focus on the strategic level, where combat can at best complement the exercise of a wide range of non-combat and non-military activities.

Yet, Hubin believes events in Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Ukraine largely have validated his arguments concerning the effects of new technologies. The real question, Hubin asks, is whether or not armies will do what he believes is necessary, which is to abandon the homothetic force structures inherited from centuries of practice.
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#26
Zu Fragen der Logistik:

https://mwi.usma.edu/the-changing-charac...s-warfare/

Zitat:The Changing Character of Supply: Rethinking Logistics in an Era of Systems Warfare

It is 2034. Tensions are on the rise in the Taiwan Strait. A small US reconnaissance team equipped with first-generation smart radios designed to operate in contested information environments is inserted onto a small island inside the adversary’s antiaccess / area denial zone. Simultaneously, other US forces begin to deploy in the area of operations with covert mobile precision-strike systems. The plan is to string together a dispersed sensor and precision-strike network to blunt adversary attacks and deter escalation.

Freedom of navigation operations during the crisis go awry and quickly escalate into a shooting conflict. But for those that need to do the shooting, the first few hours of the conflict do not go well. Sending and receiving information between the recon teams, other sensors, and the fire support assets does not happen. Something has gone terribly wrong.

A previously unknown Assassin’s Mace capability has disrupted radio signals, leaving only unintelligible static. The good news is that analysts in theater are quickly able to understand the nature of the interference and realize that a small adapter can be added to the antenna to restore communications. But now comes the difficult part: determining how to design and build tens of thousands of these completely new parts and distribute them to US forces like the small reconnaissance team cut off in a denied environment.

Welcome to combat logistics in the age of systems-confrontation warfare, where rapidly designing, producing, and deploying wartime combat resources while defending against complex systems-confrontation attacks on US logistics systems becomes the norm.
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#27
Auch so ein Thema wird die Frage der Informationskriegsführung sein. Geeignete ideelle Werte wären hier wie eine Impfung der Bevölkerung gegen solche Informationen, aber da genau das uns fehlt, ist die Frage entweder wie man solche ideellen Werte wieder durchsetzt, oder was sonst getan werden kann?!

https://mwi.usma.edu/we-ignore-the-human...own-peril/
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#28
Ein meiner Meinung nach recht interessante Befragung des tschechischen Oberst Dr. Jan Mazal - Head of the Department of Military Robotics at the University of Defense - zur Roboterkriegsführung in den nächsten Dekaden:

https://www.czdefence.com/article/jan-ma...ic-systems

Ich kann mich da eigentlich immer nur wiederholen: Wir benötigen eher vorgestern als gestern eine europäische DARPA, und wenn sich dies nicht schnell genug realisieren lässt unilateral eine deutsche DARPA.
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#29
Ein längeres PDF über Irreguläre Kriegsführung dass schlußendlich die gleiche These wie ich vertritt, dass man eigentlich die meisten militärischen Systeme und Einheiten auch in irregulärer Weise einsetzen kann bzw. diese im irregulären Krieg ebenso wertvoll sein können wie dafür spezialisierte Elemente:

https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/20...ummary.PDF

Und ein interessantes Buch über unkonventionelle Kriegsführung mit einem Schwerpunkt auf Counter-Terrorism welche ich gerade angefangen habe kann hier kostenlos gelesen werden:

https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/oa-e...am-collins
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