Russland vs. Ukraine

[Quintus Fabius]

Die Beiträge zu den Drohnen habe ich in den UCAV Strang verschoben, also hierhin:

https://www.forum-sicherheitspolitik.org...48&page=74

Schneemann: wenn du geneigst wärst könntest du deine Anmerkung ja auch noch in einem eigenen Post dort eintragen, und sie hier entsprechend einfach rauskopieren.



https://www.npr.org/2022/07/20/111241488...8491879078

Corruption concerns involving Ukraine are revived as the war with Russia drags on


JOMINI

(hatte Corona und lässt sich diesbezüglich für die Unterbrechung seiner Arbeit entschuldigen, ernsthaft)

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15503...m_5oMrAAAA

Gesamtkarte:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15503...05/photo/1

1/ Ukrainian TVD, Day 124-148. Late June to mid-July has seen a host of developments throughout the Ukrainian Theater of Military Action. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) have managed to secure the Luhansk Oblast but struggle to produce results on other fronts.

2/ Since it has been over three weeks since my last thread, I will be breaking up my normal update over the course of several days. There is a lot of data to analysis and discuss, therefore today’s thread will be a short one on the major events of the past three weeks.

3/ Weather Outlook. The ten-day Forecast will see temps range from 32-23 C during the day and 19-13 C at night. Cloud cover will not degrade air & missile strikes, while moderate night illumination will aid UAF infiltration activity. Wind Speed & direction favors UAF artillery.

Infiltration in feindlich besetztes Gebiet ist ohnehin eine der am wenigsten diskutieren und dennoch sehr bedeutenden militärischen Aktivitäten der Ukrainer. Die Ukrainer haben sogar komplette Bataillone welche spezifisch auf diese Aufgabe hin spezialisiert sind und die teilweise auch in Zivil kämpfen (und russischen Gerüchten zufolge auch in erbeuteten russischen Uniformen. Eine der bekanntesten solchen Einheiten gehört zu Azow.

Karte Kharkiv:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15503...56/photo/1

4/ Kharkiv OD. The VSRF still lacks the capacity for anything more than small-scale action to recapture ground lost in May 2022 to the UAF counteroffensive in this OD. The Russians will most likely invest time and resources to harden defenses of critical infrastructure.

Karte Donezk Oblast:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15503...86/photo/1

5/ Donetsk Oblast OD. The capture of Luhansk Oblast is the first real tangible success Russia has experienced since 24 Feb 2022. The OGRFR is in an ideal position to punch through the weakest part of UAF defenses in north Donetsk Oblast if it can isolate the close fight.

6/ UAF long range artillery strikes are the main obstacle to the VSRF. If the UAF can continue to strike deep and destroy Russian ammo and fuel depots they can replicate the success they experienced in grinding the Russian offensive before Kyiv to a halt.

Das wird die entscheidende Frage in der nächsten Zeit, wie schnell und wie weitgehend die Russen auf diese neue Bedrohung reagieren werden / reagieren können. Rein theoretisch wären sie demgegenüber keineswegs hilflos.

Karte Zaporizhzhia:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15503...48/photo/1

7/ Zaporizhzhia OD. Although action here remains localized attacks to improved tactical positioning the introduction of new UAF units in the Vuhledar may signal the UAF intent for a larger counteroffensive that can threaten Russian logistical infrastructure in this region.

Karte Kherson / Odessa:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15503...00/photo/1

8/ Odesa-Kherson OD. The Ukrainian counteroffensive into northern Kherson Oblast and Kherson city has been the most profitable for the UAF over the past 24 days. UAF units have been able to push within 10-12km of Kherson, well into the interior of Russian fortified defenses.

9/ UAF & VSRF units remain at a level of relative parity along an extended front. If the VSRF is unable to rapidly adapt to the targeting of its command posts, supply depots, and key GLOCs it is likely the UAF will be able to cause a breakdown in the cohesion of Russian defenses.

Sollte dem so kommen, dann halte ich eine Eskalation des Krieges für die wahrscheinlichste Variante.

10/ Tomorrow’s update will focus on naval developments. An assessment on air operations will follow this weekend, as well as a deep dive into operational trends and the likely trajectory of operations for the late summer / early fall.

11/ Assessments of UAF & VSRF units is based on my judgement of combat capability due to length of time on the line weighted against the intensity of combat a unit has likely recently experienced.

12/ I would like to thank @battle_order
for allowing the use of their outstanding unit icons on these operational map updates.

Und natürlich immer einen Blick wert:

https://militaryland.net/

Insbesondere finde ich die folgende Meldung relevant, dass die Ukraine weitere Einheiten in den Donbass wirft. Statt diese als Reserve zurück zu halten oder bei Kherson anzusetzen:

https://militaryland.net/ukraine/ukraine...to-donbas/