Russland vs. Ukraine

[Schneemann]

Sri Lanka ist eigentlich nur die Spitze des Eisberges, es wird noch mehr Länder betreffen. In Bezug auf Sri Lanka ist es zumal eher so, dass das Land schon vor dem Krieg politisch arg labil und überschuldet war. Quasi war das Land schon durch die Corona-Pandemie (Wegfall von Einnahmen aus dem Tourismus) in Schräglage geraten, dazu kam noch eine verkorkste Steuerpolitik - der Krieg hat hier also nur den Tropfen dargestellt, der die Sache zum Überlaufen brachte.

Zur Seekriegslage im Schwarzen Meer:

Ukraine Is Turning The Tide Against Russian Navy In Black Sea

Russia's navy is, by any measure, more powerful than Ukraine's. But the war is not going all their way. At sea, the Russian Navy is finding itself retreating from a large swathe of the Black Sea. [...] It has dialed back its presence off the Ukrainian coast near Odesa. Much of the northern Black Sea is now a defacto no-go zone for its ships. This likely contributed to the decision to retreat from Snake Island, a strategic gain it made early in the war. [...]

In the early days of the Ukraine Invasion, the Russian Navy dominated the northern part of the Black Sea, between Crimea and Ukraine. They quickly captured the outpost at Snake Island, near the Romanian border in the southwest corner of the zone. A blockade on merchant ships was quickly effected. Several were attacked, sending a clear message. This threat has kept merchant vessels at bay. [...]

The situation dramatically changed less than two months into the war, on April 13. Two Ukrainian made Neptune anti-ship missiles, a derivative of the Russian Kh-35, hit her amidships. The missiles, possibly pre-production examples, were launched from land. By a combination of factors, perhaps including some bad luck and some training gaps, the ship sunk the next day. The sinking of Moskva will be in case studies for years to come. A ship which, on paper, had respectable anti-ship missile defenses (ASMD), was caught off guard. David had defeated Goliath. [...]

Starting in May there were reports that Denmark would supply Harpoon anti-ship missiles. These were felt by the Russian Navy on June 17 when a valuable support vessel, Vasiliy Bekh, was hit by two. This was despite having a Tor system strapped to its deck. It was sunk. On June 20 Harpoon were again used to neutralize a Russian controlled gas platform in the Black Sea. These platforms were being used for surveillance. Russian ships became even more cautious, and the supply line to Snake Island even more strained. Ukrainian drone strikes and missile attacks were beginning to wear down the defenses. And Harpoon kept vital resupplies at bay. [...]

The Russian Navy is sailing much less. Patrol areas tend to be well away from the Ukrainian coast. The amphibious ships are increasingly kept in port, and offensive operations are limited to cruise missile launches. These are often from right outside the home port entrance. [...] Even the Admiral Grigorovich class frigates are operating well away from the threat. This does not speak of confidence in their ASMD capabilities. Much further away from the action, Russia has suddenly started increasing defenses of the Kerch Bridge. This is out of range of most Ukrainian weapons, but unusual decoys have been deployed. It suggests a heightened sense of risk. [...] We should not think that Russia is no longer the stronger navy. But the threat of Harpoon and other systems has pushed it into an almost passive role.

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/202...black-sea/

Schneemann