09.06.2022, 05:18
Zwar haben vor der UN die meisten Mitgliedstaaten den russischen Angriffskrieg verurteilt (von einer Handvoll "üblicher Verdächtiger" einmal abgesehen), dennoch ist die Lage in bspw. Südamerika etwas differenzierter zu betrachten, hier hat man sich bislang eher auf humanitäre Hilfe und verhaltene Kritik konzentriert; auch in Asien schleichen einige Länder wie die Katze um den vielfach bemühten heißen Brei bzw. um diesen Krieg herum und suchen eher nach dem eigenen Vorteil, etwa Indien oder China (also die beiden größten).
Ein Blick auf Afrika und wie sich die dortigen Länden positionieren, ist bislang aber eher stiefmütterlich angegangen worden, was vermutlich auch daran liegt, dass Afrika wirtschaftlich eben schwächer ist. Dabei ist es gerade der Kontinent, der von der Getreidelieferungsproblematik mit am stärksten betroffen ist.
Dazu ein recht interessanter Artikel:
Und wenn ich schon Indien oben kurz anspreche - auch hier eine Einschätzung:
Schneemann
Ein Blick auf Afrika und wie sich die dortigen Länden positionieren, ist bislang aber eher stiefmütterlich angegangen worden, was vermutlich auch daran liegt, dass Afrika wirtschaftlich eben schwächer ist. Dabei ist es gerade der Kontinent, der von der Getreidelieferungsproblematik mit am stärksten betroffen ist.
Dazu ein recht interessanter Artikel:
Zitat:Africa: The War in Ukraine Through an African Lenshttps://allafrica.com/stories/202206080280.html
African policymakers and civil society opinion makers, like their counterparts around the world, share no consensus on the war in Ukraine. [...]
The head of the African Union, Sengalese President Macky Sall, is meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Friday, June 3, to discuss the war and how to resolve these issues for the African continent. This involves wheat exports from Ukraine, which must pass through Russian-controlled ports or the port of Odessa on the Black Sea. Russia has also limited grain exports except to its top customers. Less noted but also vital for Africa are fertilizer exports from Belarus, blocked by closure of the export route through Lithuania. [...]
But the reluctance of African governments to vote for Western resolutions at the United Nations, or take sides with Washington and its policy of military escalation, should not be seen as support for the Russian invasion or for Vladimir Putin.
Yet both the Biden administration and Congress continue to demand that African leaders take sides. On April 27, for example, the House of Representatives passed the “Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act” by a margin of 415 to 9. The bill essentially mandates a new Cold War in Africa, including action against African governments that “facilitate the evasion of United States sanctions against Russia.”
The debate about causes and responsibility for the war in Ukraine will undoubtedly continue. Some in Africa, as elsewhere around the world, may resist Washington’s demands to take sides because they approve of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Governments in a few African countries, notably Mali and the Central African Republic, may do so because of Russian military support they have been receiving since the Wagner Group joined the host of French, U.S., and international agencies providing training and “advice” to African security forces. [...]
As President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania commented in the late 1990s, wars waged by big powers, hot or cold, have not been good for Africans. [...] Peacemaking is essential. Wars must eventually end, and negotiation is essential even with those who have committed atrocities. As Africans know, the causes of war and who was the aggressor or who committed the worst atrocities can be debated endlessly among historians, active participants, and innocent civilians and victims and their descendants for generations. But Africans also know from experience, the vast majority of those involved in wars want peace and the freedom to go about their lives. [...]
That caution is even more critical in the age of social media as both information and disinformation propagate around the world at Internet speed. This is particularly true of Ukraine, in which the disinformation wars have been well rehearsed by all parties since the first Cold War ended in the early 1990s. For Africans, the war in Ukraine is a painful reminder that Western foreign policy priorities, in part as reflected by mainstream Western media outlets, are still shaped primarily by racial bias and geopolitical rivalries rather than the urgent global issues that face Africa and the world. [...]
Although news attention to Ukraine dropped significantly in April and May, it was still much more prominent in news in the United States than comparable conflicts in Africa or elsewhere in the Global South, according to Google Trends. [...] Africans focused on world affairs, less blinded by the Washington-insider tilt towards the Biden administration’s hawkish foreign policy than pundits in the West, should be emulated rather than scorned for their critical analysis of yet another “white people’s war” in Europe.
Und wenn ich schon Indien oben kurz anspreche - auch hier eine Einschätzung:
Zitat:Modi’s Multipolar Moment Has Arrivedhttps://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/06/mod...olar-quad/
India, now courted by all sides, is the clear beneficiary of Russia’s war.
In every crisis, someone always benefits. In the case of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, that someone is Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. By refusing to condemn Moscow and join Western-led sanctions, Modi has managed to elevate India’s global stature. Each of the other major powers—the United States, Russia, and China—are intensely courting India to deny a strategic advantage to their adversaries. Relishing the spotlight, Modi and his Hindu-nationalist government will surely look to keep the momentum going. Their likely goal is to carve out an independent superpower role for India, hasten the transition to a multipolar international system, and ultimately cement its new status with a permanent United Nations Security Council seat for India. [...]
Since 2018, New Delhi and Washington have held annual summits and signed numerous groundbreaking security agreements. Both nations are part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the Quad), along with Australia and Japan. At the Quad summit in Tokyo last month, Modi met U.S. President Joe Biden in person for the second time, complementing the two nations’ ongoing virtual discussions. New Delhi also joined Washington’s recently unveiled Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, which aims to intensify economic relations in the region short of a formal trade treaty. [...]
But when Russia invaded Ukraine, India decided to pursue an ultra-realist policy and protect Indian interests above all else—not least its deep dependence on Russia for military equipment. Rather than condemning one sovereign nation for invading and seeking to destroy another—an indisputable violation of the rules-based order—India demurred. At first, the Modi government’s strategy appeared destined to damage the U.S.-India partnership. In March, Biden described India’s commitment on punishing Russia as “somewhat shaky.” In early April, U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor Daleep Singh visited New Delhi and warned of potential “consequences” for countries that attempt to undermine U.S. sanctions. [...]
Over the last few months, India has also preserved its close ties to Russia by repeatedly abstaining at the United Nations when Western countries tabled resolutions against Russia. Russia and India have a long-standing partnership that dates back to the Cold War, when New Delhi believed Washington was actively supporting archrival Pakistan. India has always appreciated Russian support, particularly in the U.N. Security Council, where the territorial status of Jammu and Kashmir has routinely come up. India also has a long history of leveraging its partnership with Russia against its other archrival, China, with which it has ongoing border tensions. For decades, India has purchased Russian arms. According to one recent estimate, approximately 85 percent of India’s military hardware is Russian. [...] New Delhi’s oil imports from Russia rose sharply following Western-led sanctioning of Moscow. The same is true for coal, where India’s stocks may be running alarmingly low. India is certainly grateful to have Russian energy to fuel its development. [...]
Because India’s neutral stance is so obviously at odds with U.S. policy, Beijing has also sensed a strategic opportunity to engage New Delhi—with the primary goal of prying it from Washington’s tightening embrace. In March, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was the first senior Chinese official since 2019 to visit India, where he made Beijing’s courtship explicit. “If the two countries join hands, the whole world will pay attention,” he said. In the runup to Wang’s visit, the Chinese Communist Party’s English-language mouthpiece, the Global Times, also struck an unusually conciliatory tone, writing: “China and India share common interests on many fronts. For instance, the West recently pointed the finger at India for reportedly considering buying Russian oil at a discounted price. But it is India’s legitimate right.” [...] Russia’s war in Ukraine has undoubtedly benefited India as great powers are competing more vigorously for New Delhi’s affection, particularly the United States and China.
Schneemann