Russland vs. Ukraine

[Quintus Fabius]

Tageszusammenfassungen:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1504332268055236611

Tag 20 und 21:

Gesamtkarte:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15043...36/photo/1

1/ Ukrainian Theater of War, Day 20 & 21: The third week of the war ends with failed Russian efforts to regain the strategic initiative in Kyiv, exposed to raids and ambushes in the Sumy Oblast, slow progress in the Donbas, and brutal siege warfare in Mariupol.

2/ Humanitarian Impact. There are now an estimated 3 million refugees in various European countries. Humanitarian corridors continue to be interdicted, blocked, or attacked by Russian forces. Civilians increasingly become targets of Russian attacks.

3/ Weather assessment. Visibility and wind speed are favorable for VKS execute aerospace operations. Temperatures generally will remain between 10/-6 C, hampering tactical movement, morale of Russian forces, and vehicle maintenance.

Kampfpanzer im Schlamm stecken geblieben:

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/150...3746790402

Karte Raum Kiew:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15043...70/photo/1

4/ Kyiv AO assessment. The continued inability of Russian forces to execute offensive operations larger than small-scale tactical assaults reveals the principal obstacle to regaining offensive momentum, unimaginative & ineffective leadership at echelons above brigade.

5/ Warfare is a vital and creative process; the great difficulty of tactics is to cause the disparate fractions of a mobile corps to unite in the execution of a decisive maneuver through simultaneous combined action in accordance with the campaign plan, resulting in victory.

Karte Nordosten:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15043...88/photo/1

6/ Northeast AO assessment. A system of rapid and continuous marches multiples the effect of an army, and at the same time neutralizes a great part of the enemy. Ukrainian Territorial Defense units in the Chernihiv & Sumy Oblasts have done just that.

7/ By moving rapidly between contested areas and striking supply convoys & patrols, the Ukrainians have immobilized parts of three Russian CAAs. Great mobility and frequent offensive movements covered by strategic reserves is the best means of defense.

Und das heißt maximale Querfeldeinbeweglichkeit !

Karte Osten:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15043...42/photo/1

8/ Kharkiv and Donbas AO assessments. Strategy fixes the direction of movement. In the Kharkiv & Donbas area, this direction is aimed at securing the borders of Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts, a stated political objective of the Kremlin.

9/ The Donets River is the topographic key to the Kharkiv-Donbas AO. Seizing this line will dislodge Ukrainian forces from the Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts, threaten to cut off forces in Kharkiv, and open the way for strategic maneuver on Dnipro.

Zunehmende Kriegsführung mit Minen und ersten IEDs - Beispiel: Kamfpanzer wird von Richtmine zerlegt:

https://twitter.com/ArmedForcesUkr/statu...6932773897

Karte Süden:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/15043...47/photo/1

10/ The Southern AO assessment. Russian operations against Mykolaiyv and Odesa have been curiously under resourced for the importance they seem to have for the Kremlin's overall war aims.

11/ Russian forces in the Kherson-Odea AO appear to be more of a detachment meant to observe and hold in position a large portion of Ukrainian forces available for the western defense of Zaporizhya.

12/ Aerospace Assessment. VKS forces still struggle with SEAD / DEAD of Ukrainian air defenses. Russian losses continue to mount among rotary and fixed wing airframes. The Russians are starting to use UAVs more effectively in support of artillery.

Das Artillerie - Drohnen Gespann erweist sich erneut als die wirkungsvollste Kombination von allen, besser als bewaffnete Drohnen für sich allein !

13/ Information War. Ukraine continues to dominate the information sphere, communicating very effective strategic messaging to punch well above their political weight and illicit essential international aid across to sustain their war effort.

14/ By contrast Russia’s messaging seems to be consumed with ensuring public perceptions of the war in Ukraine remain at least neutral, if not supportive. Coercing domestic support is critical if the MoD hopes to bring in enough reservists & conscripts to replace losses.

15/ Russian Overall Assessment. Until Russian commanders can grasp and implement unified action, they will remain incapable of regaining any semblance of offensive momentum regardless of improvements to logistics, morale, or manpower replacement.

16/ Likewise, Kremlin leadership will have to eventual face the long-term political impact the war is having on the sustainability of the Russian state as the international community further isolates the ability of the Russian government to function.