25.02.2022, 14:56
Eine Analyse des bisherigen Kampfgeschehens, die ich aber rein persönlich nicht in allen Aspekten teile. Dennoch mal eine ganz gute Gesamtzusammenstellung mit allerlei Anreizen zum Nachdenken:
https://twitter.com/realcynicalfox/statu...05184?s=24
https://twitter.com/realcynicalfox/statu...05184?s=24
Zitat:Day 1 of Combat, Takeaways from available information:
1.Russians broke with their own doctrine of relying on heavy, concentrated support fires.
2.Failure to prepare the operational area with adequate preparatory fire to break up and destroy Ukrainian defenses was a critical hinderance.
3.Russians allowed themselves to dilute their own strength by advancing (and dividing their forces & fires) along 4 axis of advance. None were capable of achieving their objectives as a result.
4.Insufficiently supported troops failed to achieve necessary tactical breakthroughs with strategic implications for the battlespace.
5.Airborne/Air Assault forces cannot operate well against even a semi-intact air defense network, or in contested airspace.
6.Airborne/Air Assault insertions against superior local forces are an expensive waste of highly trained manpower.
7.Commando actions ala Otto Skorzeny in the Ardennes 1944, in Kyiv, did not achieve much success. Commando infiltration of Kyiv a major success prior to operations – massive Ukrainian security failure.
8.Russian morale is lower than expected. Some units appear to have anticipated being met with grateful Ukrainian crowds instead of stiff opposition.
9.Leadership at the Platoon, Company & Battalion level highly questionable in some units based on behavior.
10.Russian troops are ‘green’ overall, noticeable reluctance to dismount APCs/IFVs and provide infantry screen for the armor when in contact. Heavy resulting casualties vs man portablt anti-tank weapons.
11.Overall battleplan’s basic assumptions on opposition levels and Russian capability fundamentally flawed. Command & Control rigid and inflexible.
12.Ukrainians delayed mobilization far too long. Decision not to hold on the Dnieper politically more viable than abandoning East Ukraine, but possibly a critical strategic failure militarily.