(Amerika) United States Marine Corps (USMC)
Über das neue sogenannte Littoral Regiment des USMC als Einheitstyp:


Zitat:The 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment will be made up of three distinct elements. There will be the Littoral Combat Team made up of an infantry battalion and a Missile Battery. The second element will be a Littoral Anti-Air Battalion; this new Anti-Air battalion is now known as 3rd LAAB. Finally, its third element, a Combat Logistics Battalion, will keep the Marine Littoral Regiment supplied.

These units will use small Littoral Combat Ships.

The Marines and Navy are currently developing a Navy Light Amphibious Warship designed specifically for the new Littoral Regiment and its mission set. While ship-to-shore will still likely be a real need, it will be more on LCACs and little boats than AAVs. These new amphibious ships will be able to essentially back up, drop a ramp and directly unload Marines, vehicles, and more.

These small vessels will have a low signature and be capable of beaching. They will be defined as shore-to-shore vessels and be capable of operating independently or with the larger fleet forces. These ships will allow Marines to establish Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations or EABOs that act as a foothold in an island-hopping campaign and serve to deny access to the sea for America’s enemies.

Struktur des Regimentes:

1 Infanterie-Bataillon inklusive 1 Raketenartillerie-Batterie / 1 Flugabwehr-Bataillon / 1 Versorgungs-Bataillon


Zitat:An MLR will be a self-deployable, multi-domain force optimized for the contact and blunt layers. It will persistently operate across the competition continuum to support the Joint Force’s role in assuring allies and partners, deterring adversaries, conducting and enabling Joint Force contact, blunt, and surge activities.

The MLR will be capable of the following missions:

• Conduct Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations

• Conduct Strike

• Coordinate Air and Missile Defense Actions

• Support Maritime Domain Awareness

• Support Surface Warfare

• Support Operations in the Information Environment

The MLR planned for Hawaii will be the first of its kind in the Marine Corps. Subsequent MLRs will potentially be based in other Pacific theater locations.

Zitat:The approximate size of the MLR is anticipated to be between 1,800 – 2,000 Marines and Sailors.
Zitat:MLRs and MEUs – Complimentary Capabilities


Number 7; Approx. 2,200 Marines and Sailors; A Command Element with three subordinate elements:

- Ground Combat Element (a reinforced battalion landing team)

The Ground Combat Element is built around an infantry battalion that provides the over-land combat power for the MEU. Assets inherent within the standard infantry battalion include medium and heavy machine guns, mortars, combined anti-armor teams and scout snipers. While assigned to the MEU, the unit, designated ‘Battalion Landing Team’, is reinforced with light armored reconnaissance vehicles, artillery, combat engineers, and assault amphibian vehicles.

- Aviation Combat Element (a reinforced composite squadron)

The Aviation Combat Element is a composite squadron that provides the MEU medium to heavy lift capability, assault support, and close air support. Although the aviation element carries the name of the Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron assigned to the MEU, its assets include MV-22B Osprey squadron, CH-53E Super Stallion heavy lift helicopters, AH-1Z Cobra helicopter gunships, UH-1Y Huey utility helicopters, and F-35B Joint Strike Fighter. The ACE includes air traffic control, aircraft maintenance/support and aviation logistics/supply capabilities.

- Logistics Combat Element (a combat logistics battalion)

The Logistics Combat Element provides combat support such as supply, maintenance, transportation, explosive ordnance disposal, military police, water production and distribution, engineering, medical and dental services, fuel storage and distribution, and other services to the deployed MEU. The LCE gives the MEU the ability to support itself for 15 days in austere expeditionary environments.


At least 3; Approx. 1,800 - 2,000 Marines and Sailors; A Command Element with three subordinate elements:

- Littoral Combat Team

The LCT will be task organized around an infantry battalion along with an anti-ship missile battery. It is designed to provide the basis for employing multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advanced base sites that can host and enable a variety of missions such as long-range anti-ship fires, forward arming and refueling of aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of key maritime terrain, and air-defense and early warning.

- Littoral Anti-Air Battalion

The Littoral Anti-Air Battalion is designed to train and employ air defense, air surveillance and early warning, air control, and forward rearming and refueling capabilities.

- Combat Logistics Battalion

The Combat Logistics Battalion provides tactical logistics support to the MLR by resupplying expeditionary advanced base sites, managing cache sites, and connecting to higher-level logistics providers. It provides expanded purchasing authorities, limited Role II medical forces, distribution of ammunition and fuel, and field level maintenance.

Wobei man hier noch bedenken sollte, dass die MLR als erste die neue Batailllonsstruktur der Infanterie-Bataillone einnehmen würden, während normale MEU die alte erst danach wechseln würden.
Eine Pro Force-2030 Argumentation:


Zitat:Gen. David Berger’s Force Design 2030 is doing more than any other military service’s plan to realize Mattis’ intent on close-combat lethality. For example, the initiative directs educating and training in this area, as well as properly manning small units with more mature leaders. It raises the rank to job requirements for fireteam leaders, squad leaders, and platoon sergeants, increasing the time, exposure, and experience needed for these specific small-unit leaders. It also directs an investment in better weapons and equipment for squad-, platoon-, and company-sized formations in order to enable them with organic intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities; tactical network and communications systems; and organic precision fires that change the long-standing equation of attacker-to-defender, this math equation for planning operations used to require three attackers for every defender, but not anymore. These changes have led to marines being able to conduct attacks much differently than in the past.

Hauptargument ist also, dass die Infanterie - als Fundament des USMC - durch die Reform insgesamt gestärkt wird und damit die Infanterie als das was das USMC ausmacht durch die Reform mehr reale Kampfkraft entwickeln kann. Dem kann ich bedingt zustimmen, es wäre aber hier noch sehr viel mehr möglich. Von daher greift das Argument zu kurz. Die folgende Ausführung zeigt das wahre Problem:

Zitat: Light infantry units have been overly dependent on non-organic fire support that has only fallen victim to kill-chain micromanagement. These problems, which pre-date the 9/11 wars, are not going to be wished away. The solution has always been clear: Provide small units with their own lethal weapons systems instead of keeping them assigned to a higher headquarters. Tragically, as Mattis stated in his Close Combat Lethality Task Force guidance, the solution to these problems has long existed. However, senior leaders responsible for combat development as well as resourcing, to include those in the Marine Corps, have not prioritized these units’ modernization.

Aber Force 2030 ist eben nicht die Antwort auf die genannte Problemstellung, sondern in Bezug auf die Infanterie nur eine Teilantwort. Der Fokus liegt immer noch zu weitgehend wo anders.

Zitat: the conceptual employment of these “system of systems” is undergoing rigorous real-world employment and development with the General Berger’s Force Design 2030 Fleet Marine Force. While many of these capabilities are new to the Marine Corps, they are combat-tested systems that have been in use by special operations forces and the militaries of allied nations such as Israel for many years.

Die Idee ist mehr Autonomie und mehr Feuerkraft nach vorne und nach unten zu bringen. Dies gelingt bedingt, bedeutet aber weiterhin eine Unterstützung der Infanterie durch andere Systeme, im vorliegenden Fall durch Drohnen. Die alte Form der Feuerunterstützung zusammen mit der neuen Form beizubehalten wäre hier noch wesentlich besser gewesen. Und die Infanterie selbst könnte ebenfalls ganz für sich allein erheblich mehr Kampfkraft entwickeln, würde man sie entsprechend ausrüsten. Dann würde aber (aus finanziellen Gründen) die Idee vor allem Schiffe mit Raketen anzugreifen nicht finanzierbar sein und das zeigt eben auf, dass man gerade eben nicht die Infanterie im Fokus hat, sondern die Bekämpfung feindlicher Schiffe, wobei die Infanterie dann nur noch Beiwerk zur Absicherung und/oder Ermöglichung dieser anderen Aufgabe ist.

Zitat:Bottom line: When a small-unit leader involved in the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s infantry battalion experimentation efforts is asked “What now, Lieutenant?” you get an entirely different response today than I did while fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Force Design 2030 provides the squad leader, platoon commander, and company commander with an increase in lethality and survivability from their own intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting assets along with loitering munitions employed with a level of precision and accuracy that minimizes the threat of collateral damage and civilian casualties. Now, when asked “What now, Lieutenant?” you get a sheepish grin, and a “Watch this, Gunner.”

Eine weitere Gefahr ist hier Überfunktionalität, eine zu große Abhängigkeit von der Technik und dem Vorliegen ganz bestimmter Umstände und notwendigen Materials und dass dadurch die Gefahr für Friktionen ebenso erhöht wird wie die Anfälligkeit des gesamten Systems bei Störungen.
Wer es sich geben will: die denkbar allerausführlichste Diskussion zum Force Desgin 2030:


Eine Kritik an den geplanten Änderungen bei der Artillerie:


Zitat:Force Design 2030 is correct that the Marine Corps requires more rocket artillery and missiles for the deep fight and for long range interdiction, which complement aviation in shaping the battlefield.

Force Design 2030 is flawed by gutting cannon artillery.

To maneuver in all types of terrain and to close with the enemy require cannon artillery.

One battalion for every Marine regiment for direct fire support has been and will continue to be the minimal requirement.

The habitual relationship between the artillery battalion and the supported infantry regiment is a combat multiplier that builds trust and confidence that an ad hoc approach to task organization does not.

Recall Napoleon’s maxim that “the moral is to the physical as three is to one.”

Relationships matter. Culture matters.
Über einige der subtilen bis rein rethorischen Änderungen beim Force Design 2030 in diesem Jahr bis jetzt:


Zitat:New rhetoric - Criticism by the retired generals has pushed the Marine Corps to change the way it describes some elements of FD 2030. The most prominent change is that FD 2030 is now described as a global strategy, not just focused on China and the Western Pacific: “We have consistently said that a modernized Marine Corps must still be capable of performing global crisis response operations.” It ascribes the misunderstanding to a failure to properly communicate the concept of FD 2030.

Zitat:Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) - ..........in the updated document, the Corps seems to be hesitating. The update states, “Feedback from FMF [Fleet Marine Force] exercises has shown that, in most cases, task-organized Marine Air Ground Task Forces perform stand-in force missions. The MLR is a component of that larger effort.” There had always been questions about why the Marine Corps needed a new and permanent organization rather than using its traditional approach of task organization. Unclear is whether this signals a change in MLR structure, a backing away from future conversions, or simply a modification in doctrine.

The update also notes that “We focused the MLR too much on lethality and not enough on sensing.” This might signal a change in structure whereby some of the ground combat force converts to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance units. However, cutting more combat power from the MLR will trigger more concerns from the retired generals since establishment of the MLR already cuts considerable firepower (two battalions) from the unit from which it was built.

Further, the update speculates whether a reconnaissance or artillery battalion might be a better base than the infantry battalion. That would mark a substantial change in the MLR structure, removing its ground combat capability and further emphasizing fires.

Zitat:Infantry battalions - The structure of infantry battalions is always highly visible because these units have traditionally been the Marine Corps’ central warfighting organization. Plans to cut the number of infantry battalions from 24 to 21 continue, but while the original plan called for cutting the size of each infantry battalion from 896 personnel to 635, the update sees a final size of 800-835 personnel.

To come to a final number, experimentation on three different structures will continue. However, all will emphasize the deployment of small teams and the incorporation of long-range precision fires.

Zitat:Artillery - The update adds back two cannon batteries, with a final artillery structure of seven cannon batteries and seven MLRS rocket batteries for sustained operations ashore by the 21 infantry battalions. In addition, there will be an unspecified number of missile batteries, likely about 14. Reserves would have nine batteries and, unusual for the Marine Corps, reserve capability might be weighted towards cannon batteries and not replicate the active-duty structure.

Zitat:Aviation - The V-22 fleet will still be cut, but instead of having 14 squadrons of 12 aircraft, the update specifies 16 squadrons of 10 aircraft each ― providing more flexibility but losing another eight operational aircraft on top of the 36 already cut (which go mostly to the training base).

Zitat:Amphibious Ships - In the near term, the Marine Corps will experiment with auxiliary ships and leased ships to understand better how to move small teams from the Marine Littoral Regiment around the Western Pacific.

One minor change is that the light amphibious warfare program is now being referred to as the landing ship, medium (LSM). It is not clear what difference in meaning the new terminology is intended to convey.

Zitat:Future structure cuts - The update lays out some future structure cuts, both to pay for FD 2030 and to further align the Marine Corps with the new vision.

- The Marine Corp will divest the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, designed for handling incidents involving weapons of mass destruction and used mostly domestically.

- The update reiterates the Marine Corps’ intention to cut personnel in service headquarters and the supporting establishment by 15 percent.

- Similarly, the Marine Corps will examine its 13,000 external billets. These support a wide variety of organizations, from joint and agency staffs to White House liaison and overseas embassies.

Zitat:Berger said the Marine Corps fundamentally revolves around its three Marine Expeditionary Forces that are each organized around their infantry — and that hasn’t changed under Force Design 2030. What has changed is the idea of how these forces can contribute to a 21st century combined arms fight, and the range of tools they’ll have to locate, close with and destroy enemy forces.

Zitat:Looking at the increasing range of weapons on not just the future battlefield but today, you’ve got to be able to sense the target before you can engage.”

The Marine Corps doesn’t want to be reliant on non-organic sensors — sensors from larger units elsewhere in the theater, Marine forces on U.S. Navy ships or even satellites or other sensors in the joint force — so the small distributed units the Marine Corps plans to deploy have to be able to see farther than they can shoot and incorporate non-organic sensing capabilities as a nice-to-have rather than something they’re dependent on.

Und diese beiden Absätze sind nun einfach ein Widerspruch in sich. Infanterie sucht den Nahkampf mit dem Feind, sie zerstört diesen im Nahkampf (im weiteren Sinne des Begriffs). Wenn man nun die gesamte Streitmacht auf Abstandswaffen, Sensoren und möglichst weitreichenden Beschuss hin ausrichtet und spezialisiert, gibt dies genau - gerade eben die Infanterie auf und damit genau das was das USMC ausgemacht hat. Was damit seine Kultur und seine Eigenheiten hervor gebracht und erhalten hat. Schlussendlich zerstört damit diese Reform das USMC in seinen Besonderheiten und dann stellt sich tatsächlich die Frage, warum man für das was da übrig bleibt noch eine eigene Teilstreitkraft vorhalten sollte und warum die entsprechende Raketenartillerie usw. nicht einfach Teil der US Armee sein kann.

Zitat:The U.S. Marine Corps has updated its Force Design 2030 plans, putting a stronger emphasis on the reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance competition as foundational to lethality, the commandant said.

Gen. David Berger told reporters May 5 the original Force Design 2030 focused heavily on the lethality of small, distributed units of Marines — whether hauling ground-based anti-ship missiles around island chains, jamming or shooting down aircraft or even detecting and firing upon submarines going through chokepoints.

Alles gut und richtig, aber es hat eben nichts mehr mit Infanterie als Kern des ganzen zu tun.

Zitat:“Although we began three years ago heavily focused on lethality, which remains important, now coming to the fore is the importance of the hider/finder, reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance, screening/counter-screening, whatever term you’d like to use — the importance of winning that upfront and always,” Berger said.

“It doesn’t diminish the importance of lethality, but you can’t use the lethality if you can’t find them. Or, said another way, if you’re so big and fat and immobile and vulnerable to their sensors, all the lethality in the world ain’t going to help you. So winning that first part, and staying on it,” has become an increasingly important aspect of Force Design 2030 modernization priorities as the service iterates.

Und gerade eben leichte Infanterie wäre besonders dafür geeignet zum einen selbst nicht so leicht aufgeklärt zu werden und andererseits selbst den Feind aufzuklären. Aber so ist das eben nicht gemeint, es geht hier in Wahrheit darum die Raketenartillerie zu befähigen und nichts anderes! Genau dieses andere aber ist es, was den eigentlichen Wert des USMC ausmacht.
Ich glaube du denkst an Afghanistan und Irak. Berger denkt an Wake und Guadalcanal
Absolut richtig. Das ist - grob vereinfacht aber korrekt - der wesentliche Unterschied. Die Frage wie eine Streitkraft aufgestellt sein sollte hängt natürlich sehr weitgehend davon ab, wofür exakt sie eingesetzt werden soll. Nur: dass die Verteidigung von Wake und Guadalcanal heute eben kein USMC mehr benötigt, sondern ganz im Gegenteil durch die US Army und die Navy für sich selbst genau so gut oder sogar besser aufgestellt wäre. Wenn man also an Wake und Guadalcanal denkt, dann stellt sich die Frage wozu man überhaupt noch das USMC vorhalten will ?!

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