(Amerika) United States Marine Corps (USMC)

[Quintus Fabius]

Meiner rein persönlichen Meinung nach sind die aktuellen Pläne von Berger ein Irrweg und der Anfang vom Ende des USMC, hier noch eine weitere Analyse dazu:

https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/j...d7d7885bbb

Forcing Design or Designing Force? The Reinvention of the Marine Corps

Force Design 2030 began in 2019, as the Commandant surveyed the possible range of future conflicts in which the Corps might find itself entangled in coming years. At that point, the last conventional campaigns conducted by a world-class military were the U.S. invasions of Iraq in 2003 and 1990. The Commandant had limited information real-world data upon which to rest his changes of the Service.

But, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has provided insight into how technological changes have affected conventional warfare. Although it is intended to prepare the Marine Corps for fighting in the Pacific, Force Design 2030 must be evaluated in light of these changes unless the Commandant does not anticipate that the Marine Corps would not contest threats to NATO allies. Any change to the Marine Corps’ doctrine or equipment that would weaken its ability to defend America’s partners must be reconsidered in light of the new threat to Europe.

The tactics on display in the Russian invasion of Ukraine lead one to doubt the wisdom of Force Design’s outcomes. The initial stages of the attack were characterized by heavy use of armor and artillery. The first Russian units across the border were tanks.

The Ukrainians have put up a heroic resistance, using American Javelin anti-tank missiles to destroy over 200 of them and leading some observers to conclude that the era of the tank is over. But, these tanks have generally been employed without integrated fire support or aviation and no infantry alongside—the opposite of American combined arms doctrine. While heavy armor will be used differently in the future than previously, the events in Ukraine demonstrate that the tank still plays a role on the battlefield. And yet they have been removed from the Marine Corps inventory. Likewise, artillery has played a significant role thus far in Ukraine—and conventional artillery’s use will only increase as the Russians run low on precision-guided munitions. Russian military doctrine emphasizes the role of artillery, relying on maneuver units to support fires rather than the reverse as in the American militaries. Artillery has been crucial to the Ukrainian defense of Kyiv.

In a conventional conflict with Russia, we would rely heavily on traditional artillery for counterbattery fire, at the very least. While the Corps’ precision rocket assets would be helpful in this effort, conventional artillery would be crucial against a force that emphasizes overwhelming firepower.

For a conflict in which tens of thousands of rounds would be expended, the cost of precision rocket artillery would become prohibitive. The Marine Corps could afford over eighty high explosive tube artillery rounds for every rocket fired. Before conflict, how many $121,000 precision rocket rounds will the Marine Corps be willing to expend—in peacetime—to prepare its personnel? Each of these rounds is worth at least four times the annual salary of the Marine firing them. How many Marines will have the chance to train with live indirect fire before they go to war?

It is not clear to what extent optimizing the force for an amphibious naval conflict would preclude its success in a ground campaign. But, it is worth considering that some of the fundamental assumptions of Force Design’s operating concepts remain true only in naval, not ground, conflicts. Integration into a naval fires network, for example, would not be possible. On land, any command node with an electromagnetic signature would likely be targeted, so a meaningful give-and-take with a fires network would be near-suicide.

Finally, it is also worth considering what the Force Design concepts do not include: ideas that specifically relate to the defense of Taiwan. This is odd given that with expertise in naval integration, the Marine Corps would be the service likely called upon to reinforce it. The concepts’ proponents could argue that expeditionary advanced bases could be used to defend the island. Generally speaking, establishing an expeditionary advanced base on Taiwan could contribute to the island’s defense.

But it wouldn’t contribute very much. There are significant differences between establishing defensive positions in a semi-permissive environment in preparation to repel an amphibious assault, as would be required in the defense of Taiwan, and the uncontested establishment of small bases on key maritime terrain as the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept envisions.

A serious defense of Taiwan against a Chinese amphibious assault would mean establishing fixed defensive positions around possible landing sites to repel landing craft. This would require, at minimum, significant artillery assets and engineering units to build fighting positions that would survive the first round of indirect fire assets. This is a very different sort of effort than the lightly armed and mobile expeditionary advanced bases are designed for.

If one believes that Force Design was intended as a response to Chinese expansion, and if one follows the logic that the security relationship with Taiwan is the centerpiece of US credibility, what the failure to address the Taiwanese defense signals about the Corps’ expectations for how it will be employed in the Indo-Pacific is anyone’s guess.

Organizational change is difficult. Choosing one option means not choosing others. Force Design is a bold step forward for the Marine Corps, but one which was based on experience born of thirty years of low-intensity conflict and an assumption that the Corps’ most pressing responsibility in coming years would be the effort to deter China. New challenges have arisen. The last several months have revealed more information about how two conventional militaries would fight than in the preceding several decades.

The operating concepts which Force Design intends to employ contain some sound ideas, some dubious assumptions, and some optimistic projections. There is much to like in the direction the Corps has chosen to march. But, unvalidated assumptions lurk in the corners.
Optimizing for naval amphibious conflict means shedding capabilities that would be useful in other contexts. And the gritty detail of those contexts have become a matter of public record since Russian tanks rolled across Ukraine’s borders. No wonder Force Design 2030 has been rejected by every single former commandant and the vast majority of retired senior leaders. For its project to continue, the Corps needs to explain how or, preferably, show

that its post-Force Design units will be able to successfully contest Chinese aggression towards Taiwan and win a conventional fight with the Russian army.

Ein wesentlicher Aspekt der hier angesprochen wird ist die Frage der Kosten unserer Kriegsführung. Wir können durch bestimmte Systeme anfangs immense Verlute beim Feind erzeugen. Reicht dies aber nicht zum sofortigen Sieg, wird die Sache kritisch und kann schnell dazu führen, dass man den weiteren Kampf mangels Quantität nicht weiter wird führen können.

Meine These ist seit Jahren, dass eine Entscheidungsschlacht geführt werden muss und dass diese sofort, gleich zu Beginn des Krieges geführt werden muss. Ein weiterer Grund neben vielen anderen ist hier die Frage der Kosten unserer Art von Kriegsführung. Darüber hinaus könnte der Krieg auch erneut ganz andere Formen annehmen und völlig anders geführt werden. Auch darauf haben die überteuren Systeme geringer Quantität keine Antwort, welche über die Eröffnung hinaus geht. Sehr oft wird an dieser Stelle auf die Kriegswirtschaft verwiesen: ja wenn, dann würden wir ja alles auf Kriegsproduktion umstellen, dann wären die Produktionskapazitäten ganz andere etc. Meiner Meinung nach ist das eine gefährliche Illusion, weil die heutigen Systeme geringer Quantität sich eben nicht (!) einfach so in Masse werden herstellen lassen, und die früheren Bedingungen (wie im 2WK) heute nicht mehr zutreffen.

Wie soll denn beispielsweise ein modernes westliches Industrieland in Masse in einer Kriegsproduktion moderne Kampfpanzer mit allem was notwendig ist herstellen können, wenn im ganzen Land nach zwei Wochen Krieg nirgends mehr Strom verfügbar ist und die gesamte zivile Infrastruktur kollabiert?! Die Idee unserer industriellen Überlegenheit als entscheidendem Faktor im Krieg ist daher fragwürdig.