02.11.2024, 18:33
Ne, überrascht ist da eigentlich niemand so recht, denke ich:
Aus 2016
Januar 2022:
Die saudische Koalition hatten es zwischen 2015-2022 mit einer See- und Luftblockade, Zerstörung von Zivilstrukturen und rund 24.000 Luftangriffen versucht. Anschließend waren die Houthi militärisch potenter als vorher. Bei Dubai sprechen wir von ca. 1400km in direkter Luftlinie. Das ist keine Nahdistanz. Für die Drohnen und Raketen geht es dabei einmal quer durch den saudischen Luftraum, der gar nicht mal so schlecht mit Patriot, THAAD mit US Personal und sonstigem Hightech bestückt ist. Das sind insofern tatsächlich keine neuen Fähigkeiten der Houthi, sondern hatte die Saudis und VAE letztlich dazu bewegt eine einvernehmliche Verhandlungslösung zu suchen. Insofern hatte diese "nicht allzu überraschende" Fähigkeit längst nicht nur einen militärischen Einmaleffekt, sondern hatte sich für die Houthi bereits als entscheidend in ihrem Krieg mit der Saudi-Koalition erwiesen.
Aus 2016
Zitat:...https://acleddata.com/2023/01/17/beyond-...2015-2022/
Similarly, in 2016, the Houthis appeared to use cross-border aerial warfare to signal a shift in local and regional alliances. Cornered by the IRG’s military advance in Nihm district, in the northeast of Sanaa, the Houthis launched a coordinated missile campaign into five Saudi districts on 23 February 2016. Subsequently, they unilaterally suspended cross-border attacks, ostensibly signaling the political will to re-establish a channel of communication. After days of preparatory talks, Houthi spokesperson Muhammad Abdussalam traveled to Zahran al-Janub to engage in negotiations on 7 March,21 which led to a nationwide ceasefire announced by the UN on 23 March.22
This case highlights how the Houthis employed aerial warfare to convey political messages at different levels. Indeed, the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia came at a sensitive time, just a few weeks after Riyadh had severed diplomatic ties with Tehran,23 thus hinting at a distancing of the Houthis from Iran. Furthermore, the Houthis’ near-monopoly of missile capabilities allowed them to maneuver cross-border attacks autonomously from their ally, Salih, pressuring him to accept the ceasefire.
The UN-mediated ceasefire led to peace talks in Kuwait from 21 April to 8 August 2016.24 During this period, armed clashes continued within Yemen’s territory at fluctuating levels, although Houthi cross-border missile/rocket attacks almost completely ceased (see graph above). Beneath the talks, the relationship between the Houthis and Tehran was developing in a new direction as Iran stepped up the transfer of small weapons and missile components to the Houthis in May. By the end of July, while the Kuwait talks were faltering, Houthi spokesperson Abdussalam announced a new rapprochement with Tehran during an interview with the Beirut-based television network, Mayadeen, in which he revived anti-Saudi rhetoric.25 This major shift in regional politics was again underlined by the resumption of cross-border attacks.
The 8 August end of the Kuwait talks marked the beginning of a novel political phase. The Houthi-Salih alliance established a new political body, the Supreme Political Council (SPC), while souring direct communication channels with Saudi Arabia.26 In mid-August, the Houthis escalated cross-border attacks, launching the heaviest and deadliest missile campaign since the beginning of the conflict (see graph above).
...
Januar 2022:
Zitat:...https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/31...escalation
On January 2, the Houthis said they seized a UAE-flagged vessel in the Red Sea, claiming it carried “military supplies”.
On January 17, a drone attack on Abu Dhabi claimed by the Houthis triggered a fuel tank blast that killed three people. The Houthis also targeted an under-construction extension of Abu Dhabi International Airport, causing a fire.
The Saudi-led coalition retaliated with intensified air strikes on what it said were military targets linked to the Houthis.
But the air raids and missile attacks reportedly hit hospitals, telecommunication infrastructure, airports, a water facility and a school, and at least 80 people were killed on January 21 when a temporary detention centre in the northern province of Saada was bombed on January 21, and about 20 were killed in Sanaa in an attack later that week.
On January 24, the UAE said it had intercepted and destroyed two ballistic missiles fired at Abu Dhabi by the Houthis.
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Most recently, the UAE announced on Monday that it intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile fired at Abu Dhabi from Yemen. The Houthis confirmed it had fired a number of ballistic missiles at Abu Dhabi, and had also launched drone attacks on Dubai.
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Die saudische Koalition hatten es zwischen 2015-2022 mit einer See- und Luftblockade, Zerstörung von Zivilstrukturen und rund 24.000 Luftangriffen versucht. Anschließend waren die Houthi militärisch potenter als vorher. Bei Dubai sprechen wir von ca. 1400km in direkter Luftlinie. Das ist keine Nahdistanz. Für die Drohnen und Raketen geht es dabei einmal quer durch den saudischen Luftraum, der gar nicht mal so schlecht mit Patriot, THAAD mit US Personal und sonstigem Hightech bestückt ist. Das sind insofern tatsächlich keine neuen Fähigkeiten der Houthi, sondern hatte die Saudis und VAE letztlich dazu bewegt eine einvernehmliche Verhandlungslösung zu suchen. Insofern hatte diese "nicht allzu überraschende" Fähigkeit längst nicht nur einen militärischen Einmaleffekt, sondern hatte sich für die Houthi bereits als entscheidend in ihrem Krieg mit der Saudi-Koalition erwiesen.
