09.06.2021, 21:00
Ein paar Auszüge:
Zitat:Game Changers
Hubin identifies in Perspectives tactiques three specific new capabilities new technologies brought about that he believes are changing warfare profoundly: the ability to know precisely and in real time where all of one’s own forces are, the ability to fire without stopping, and precision indirect fires.
Knowing where everyone is gives one an unprecedented ability to fine-tune economy of means. It also facilitates dispersion: There is less need to group together to facilitate communication or avoid friendly fire incidents. Meanwhile, not having to stop to fire, according to Hubin, means, obviously, that one can keep moving, which is a growing imperative in the age of precise fires. It also undermines the linearity that historically has characterized battle: Stopping to aim and fire as either an attacker or a defender means taking up a fixed position relative to the adversary, and a typical maneuver is to have some troops fix the enemy while others attempt to go around or behind it. Now there is a front, a flank, and a rear. There is an axis of movement. Polarity. If one can keep moving, there is much less need to assume a fixed position relative to the adversary and, therefore, much less linearity or polarity. This also means, Hubin points out, that the two sides are more likely to get mixed up together. (Hubin uses the word imbrication, which, in English, is mostly reserved for geology to describe overlapping deposits or rocks.)
Meanwhile, precision indirect fires have several implications. They encourage and facilitate dispersion, because one can hit any target within range regardless of where one is, and because concentration has become increasingly hazardous. Also, as with the ability to shoot on the move, precision fires undermine linearity, with important implications for how forces are arranged in geographic space and how they move. Until recently, Hubin explains, the approach has been for some troops to move forward to engage and destroy the enemy, while others stay behind in the rear to support the forward troops. “In war as in love,” Hubin writes, citing Napoleon, “one has to get close.” This reinforces the polarity evident in tactics and maneuver, for there is a front, a back, and an axis of movement. Commanders arranged their subordinates accordingly, with bodies on the move accompanied by flanking units, van guards, and rearguards. Precision indirect fires, however, inverts the relationship. Combat forces’ job now is to find the enemy and, ideally, concentrate the enemy’s forces so they can be destroyed by indirect fires, which, from now on, will do the killing. This implies a weaker degree of polarity, especially if one assumes imbrication.
Another ramification of precision indirect fires has to do with logistics: The intrinsic inaccuracy of indirect fires in the past — especially against moving targets — has meant that achieving desired effects usually requires large quantities of ammunition. This, in turn, has required a massive logistical umbilical cord that limits maneuver and reinforces polarity with respect to the existence of a front, a back, and an axis of movement. Units break that cord at their peril. The French word for this cord is the noria, which refers to the chain of trucks or other vehicles that go back and forth to keep forward units supplied. Against the noria, Hubin contrasts the idea of “pulsation.” Logistics will “pulse” needed material as needed, when and where it is needed. Pulsation implies discontinuity, which normally would mean the death of the noria system and, ultimately, of ground maneuver, but now the point is to shed linearity and free up maneuver.
These new capabilities, combined with the growing danger to any concentration of forces even at the company scale, tend to push down the size of maneuver units. Smaller units at lower echelons will become more important than larger and higher ones. Platoons with two or three patrols will have the role battalions once did. As the pawns get smaller, Hubin argues, at some point, the integration of combined arms — which, in the French army, currently does at the company-level with the Combined Arms Tactical Subgroup — also has to stop. Integration below the Combined Arms Tactical Subgroup will have to give way to cooperation. Different elements will act to achieve the same goal, just not necessarily within the same unit.
Hubin uses homothety to describe the structure of different ground force units at different echelons (i.e., division, brigade, company, etc.), their relationship to one another in space, and also their relationship to a fixed point. Each echelon is a dilation of the same form, and each is homothetic in relation to a fixed point, i.e., a single point of command and control at which all lines ultimately converge, and also a fixed space within which units operate. Homothety denotes fixity or rigidity of shape (though not scale), of command and control structure, and of the physical area of operation.
Naturally, multi-domain operations requires a more horizontal flow of information and more flexible lines of communication. Hubin, however, wants to go further. Hubin wants to break the rigidity both of the shapes of army units and of their physical relationship with one another, more specifically their homothetic relationship relative to a fix point, and, likewise, the fixed area within which each echelon operates. Armies will need to be able to adjust who is subordinate to whom, create or suppress levels of responsibility, and permanently adapt the size and maneuver space of a given echelon. The “rectilinear shapes” of brigades and battalions are “inherently constraining” and no longer necessary, so armies had best be willing to back away from them. Everything must be fluid. The only predefined structure that will remain, he writes, is the platoon, the artillery piece, and the “engineering group.” Sometimes, several of these will be grouped together. Likewise, subordination will have to be flexible. One will see an armored unit engage under the orders of one commander but then pass under the command of another six hours later and end up under the orders of a third the next day.
One of the problems Hubin sees with the homothetic system is that, to a considerable degree, the commanders at the division, regiment, and company level are responsible for the same tasks of “conception,” “conduct,” and “execution.” This already has become problematic. Division-level commanders have little to do with the conduct of operations, and company-level commanders are too busy to do anything beyond execution, and, more often than not, they have to rely on instinct. Most interesting is the fate of the captain, which Hubin aligns with the “group” level, meaning the battalion-level combined arms tactical group. “The group conceives in haste and can only conduct,” Hubin writes, “which means to organize, coordinate, and articulate the means in space and time and monitor the coherence of the action.” But now that warfare is becoming more decentralized, and combat is increasingly the affair of small echelons, the system is losing all of its coherence. There needs to be a new division of labor, one that has nothing to do with the legacy hierarchy of the homothetic system, i.e., divisions/brigades, regiments, and companies, and is built entirely around the functions of conception, conduct, and execution.
Hubin proposes three levels of “tactical organization,” which he lays out in chapter 10 of Perspectives, but is related most succinctly in a clarifying email to the author. One is in charge of “maneuver conception,” which, he explained, “is to say to imagine, create and define what we call the idea of maneuver.” Another level is in charge of execution, “that is to say in charge of the fight with their equipment.” “At this level,” Hubin explains, “we will find patrols of armored, infantry, engineers’ group, artillery observation teams, etc.” Between these two levels, Hubin continues:
I propose to create an original system to control zones of maneuver to be sure that the different tactical pawns fighting in his zone work toward the aim defined by the conception level, i.e. to organize the different movements in his area, to allow an effective circulation of information, to organize what I call logistic rendezvous, and mainly to watch over the safety of the tactical pawns. What is brand new, is that this level is not linked to a tactical structure (platoon, company, battalion) but is attached to a portion of terrain on which the maneuver is evolving. In a way, ground tactical organization will draw nearer to air control organization.
Hubin imagines small units moving around the battlespace passing from the control of different commanders, each responsible for specific zones and responsible for coordinating activities and also providing resupply, in conformity with the objective determined by the “conception echelon.” Units in their space will associate with each other temporarily and flexibly. Implied here is the idea of abandoning traditional correlations between a commander’s rank and the degree of authority and responsibility.
“One must break the existing relationship,” he writes, “between the importance of the level of responsibility and the volume of the subordinates.” Hubin argues that such a radical transformation is necessary to derive from the new technologies their full benefit. Training and Doctrine Command, in comparison, comes close to this idea by arguing for granting to “the lowest appropriate echelon” authority to access support from across the range of “domains,” such as intelligence from national surveillance assets, and certainly fires from joint capabilities to which normally only higher echelons might have ready access.
For a long time, Hubin explains, maneuver was about hiding the bulk of one’s force (the gros), its location, and its intentions. Where was it going? Much of maneuver was about hiding this for as long as possible so as to benefit from some measure of surprise. Meanwhile, opposing commanders have to deduce the answers and, ultimately, gamble. In the future, according to Hubin, this will be more difficult to do because of all the sensors. The challenge will be less getting information than processing it.
This does not mean, however, that surprise will be impossible. Hubin uses the analogy of chess players: Both can see exactly where all the pieces are, yet it is still possible to surprise one’s opponent. The surprises are intellectual. “Surprise is realized by he who has the best vision of the situation, he who grasps the soonest and with the most clarity what is happening, and who knows how to coordinate the apparently incoherent action of his pieces such that the adversary remains eaten by doubt and does not know what move to make.” In any case, nowadays, even the idea of having a gros is questionable to the extent that it implies concentration. Maneuver, in fact, will have “inverted objectives.” Hubin explains that “the goal” of maneuver” will be “maintaining the dilution of one’s forces while obtaining the concentration of those of the enemy in order to give ground-to-ground indirect fires and air-to-ground fires better results.”
Hubin’s vision of the future battlefield has implications for the evolution of command style. Because of the impossibility of knowing how the enemy will react to what one does, he explains, the French army has always taught the imperative of trusting one’s gut. Decide, and decide fast. Of course, he notes, this is a bit like playing Russian roulette. Guessing right can determine whether or not one will be a national hero or a disgrace. This will change: The quantity of data and current and future computing power makes it increasingly possible to run models and simulations and quickly come up with something close to objective answers. That said, Hubin does not stray far from Foch and the French army’s emphasis on initiative and the offensive spirit. According to Hubin, initiative will count more than ever. One has to keep moving, which means one has to be the one with the initiative. Otherwise, one is finished. Part of that involves “resolution,” which Hubin thinks is necessary for risking the intermixing of one’s forces. You want to be inside the enemy’s formations, not the other way around.
Hubin, consistent with French doctrine, is pushing the mandate for initiative down to junior officers and noncommissioned officers in a context in which he does not expect unit structures to be relevant. Hubin’s junior commanders need to be able to stride boldly among the hosts of the enemy and place their trust in others they very likely will not know. He admits that this presents a profound challenge for unit cohesion. Historically combat units have preserved cohesion through proximity (ideally by remaining within sight of everyone else) and bonds of familiarity and trust. One fights shoulder-to-shoulder with those one knows and those with whom one has trained. Units also have striven to maintain lines of communication and support. Meanwhile, they would do everything possible to break the cohesion of opposing forces, which Hubin notes is a far better objective than seeking to destroy them materially. On the modern battlefield, proximity is dangerous, and, in fact, the situation in many ways is reversed: The better a force can operate physically scattered and mixed up with the adversary, the more likely it is to succeed.
On the future battlefield, the concentration of efforts will lose importance and become almost impossible to the extent that it is synonymous with the physical concentration of resources. Economy of force will take on new importance and also be conducted differently. The more units “can adjust rapidly, frequently, and fleetingly, the better will be their chances of success.”
All War is Asymmetrical
Hubin’s arguments about economy of forces leads him to a powerful idea, one that, as we shall see, gives him an edge relative to multi-domain operations: Strategy in the kind of conventional warfare Hubin envisions is similar to the strategy required for waging asymmetrical warfare, particularly as Beaufre described it. Beaufre had written that, in asymmetrical warfare, the insurgent needs to understand that a “decision” cannot be sought in battle — where any concentration of means is suicide — but rather through an “external maneuver.” This means, for example, shaping public opinion abroad or, in general, using whatever levers of power one might have at one’s disposal other than military force to limit the adversary’s liberty of action and obtain an advantage. One must not focus on the tactical fight — wherein the objective is simply to hold on — but instead focus on the strategic level. This means, for the asymmetrical commander, “no axial maneuver, no arrows on a map, and no mass to dissimulate, but on the contrary an isotropic maneuver concerning the entire zone of action.” More importantly, it also means that the entire military campaign is subordinate to non-military maneuvers such as information warfare, psychological warfare, and the whole panoply of things one does to hem in the adversaries’ liberty of action. Correspondingly, this is where the counter-insurgent, the one seeking to defeat an asymmetrical campaign, also needs to focus.
Hubin is arguing that the above description of a correct asymmetrical strategy matches his description of how future conventional battles will be fought. This implies that, instead of seeking decision on the battlefield, future commanders will have to focus on the strategic level, where combat can at best complement the exercise of a wide range of non-combat and non-military activities.
Yet, Hubin believes events in Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Ukraine largely have validated his arguments concerning the effects of new technologies. The real question, Hubin asks, is whether or not armies will do what he believes is necessary, which is to abandon the homothetic force structures inherited from centuries of practice.