Gestern, 16:33
@kato
Danke für diese Informationen. Das war mir so tatsächlich nicht bekannt.
Anbei ein recht lesenswerter Beitrag zu den Ambitionen Chinas in der Arktis und die möglichen Folgen der strategisch zwar nachvollziehbaren Politik der USA, aber deren plumpe und die Verbündeten vor den Kopf stoßende Umsetzung.
Schneemann
Danke für diese Informationen. Das war mir so tatsächlich nicht bekannt.
Anbei ein recht lesenswerter Beitrag zu den Ambitionen Chinas in der Arktis und die möglichen Folgen der strategisch zwar nachvollziehbaren Politik der USA, aber deren plumpe und die Verbündeten vor den Kopf stoßende Umsetzung.
Zitat:China is the main beneficiary of Trump’s Arctic anticshttps://www.ft.com/content/e5e9c46e-ed7e...1ec3137390
As the US redeploys its navy and alienates allies, Beijing is filling the void [...]
US aggression against adversaries and allies alike is changing the strategic geography of the globe. Russia may be first to benefit from Donald Trump’s erratic campaign against Nato to “get Greenland”. But only China stands to reap long-term strategic rewards across the globe — including in the Arctic region that Washington claims to be defending. With each new and unexpected mis-step in the western hemisphere — from abducting Venezuela’s leader to talk of conquering a Nato ally’s territory to threats to subjugate Canada — Trump is opening new and unexpected avenues for Chinese access and influence. [...]
As Trump takes an axe to Pax Americana in the western hemisphere, Xi Jinping will continue to book gains in the western Pacific, where China’s primary strategic interests lie. China’s military already enjoys growing freedom of action around Taiwan — aided by the redeployment of key US Navy assets to the Caribbean and Middle East. Under these permissive conditions, Xi can afford to bide his time and marshal China’s resources for future conflicts closer to home, exploiting any opportunity to break free of America’s perceived “encirclement and containment” of China. [...]
Trump is correct that securing the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap and the Panama Canal are vital for US national interests; preventing an enemy from controlling or denying these chokepoints is indeed a “homeland security” concern. But his impulsive moves, like tariffs and invasion threats, perversely elevate China’s interests. With no reason to challenge the US militarily in its own hemisphere — and no naval or military presence near Greenland nor any actual “control” of the Panama Canal — China can play its strongest cards in America’s backyard, almost all of which are economic in nature.
Schneemann