(Luft) Boeing P-8A Poseidon in der Bundeswehr (Zwischenlösung P-3C-Nachfolger)

[DopePopeUrban]

@DeltaR95

denn:

However, assuming an MDR of 500 yards of a more modern submarine, that same 32-buoy search pattern deployed at 5 MDR spacing could only cover 47 square miles with the same probability of submarine detection. Therefore, to generate the same amount of coverage as in previous years, significantly more sonobuoys would need to be deployed. A point of diminishing returns is reached as many MPA are only capable of monitoring a limited number of sonobuoys simultaneously. In short, passive detection against today's submarines relies on precisely knowing where to look and when to look there, or the chances of detection are drastically reduced.

Furthermore, in the tracking phase, a submarine travelling at 7 knots (a notional figure below the detectable blade threshold rate of most submarines) with a passive detection range of that same notional 500 yards used in the buoy spacing example above will provide fewer than 5 minutes of contact time on each sonobuoy. (i.e. at 7 knots, the submarine will travel approximately 1000 yards in about 4 and a half min-utes, 500 yards detectable into the buoy and 500 yards down Doppler outbound from DIFAR 99 as shown in the figure below).

Seite 40/41
https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads...SW_web.pdf

Zentral dabei:

6.11 Summary

As this study is focused on Maritime Air's capability in the ASW domain, it is important to recognize a variety of methods exist for cueing an MPA or helicopter onto a potential submarine. Surface ship-mounted towed-array sonar systems and hull-mounted active sonar exist in almost every NATO nation's navy. Other methods including satellite detection of emissions and Surveillance Towed Array Sonar System (SURTASS) Low-Frequency Active Sonar exist to generate potential submarine locations. To exploit this, MPA and helicopters routinely practice prosecution of submarine datums generated by surface ships.

Seite 42
https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads...SW_web.pdf

Und weiter:

8.6 Is an MPA Needed for ASW?

ASW has been proven to be best conducted using a layered, and when possible federated, system of sensors.
20 From space systems to bottom mounted sensors and leveraging the capabilities of platforms above, on and below the sea, NATO has best succeeded in locating and tracking non-NATO submarines when exploiting the full spectrum of available resources employed in a layered approach.
The ocean is a diverse and challenging environment, and there are many reasons why a single sensor could lose contact on a submarine from one moment to the next, not the least of which could be the experience of the submarine commander in exploiting weaknesses in detection and tracking tech-nology. Although few would argue that one of the best systems for tracking a submarine is another submarine, due in no small part to its inherent speed, stealth and duration similarities, MPA, MPH and space systems provide an irreplaceable part of the ASW continuum.

Some have postulated that the MPA capability could be'outsourced' to ships and their embarked ASW capable helicopters. This study concludes that at the tactical, or naval task force level, embarked helicopters are capable of screening friendly ships against an ASW threat, although continual, persistent 24-hour coverage would be limited by the number of aircraft and crews within the task force. Although coordinated operations in a hi-boy/low-boy role are common between MPA and helicopters, an MPA in this instance is also suited to address the need to search, detect and potentially engage at distance, prior to the arrival of the task force into an operations area. Furthermore, MPA provides the ability to deliver ordnance on a potentially hostile submarine and then returning to land to re-load and re-arm, giving the task force commander the flexibility to employ ASW weapons without depleting the at-sea task force inventory.

Seite 57
https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads...SW_web.pdf

Oder anders gesagt, das Paper formuliert das aus, was ich ursprünglich zu der Thematik gesagt habe. MPAs sind, was ASW betrifft, hauptsächlich Plattformen zur Feinverortung und zur Bekämpfung von Zielen. Sie sind kein Asset um U-Boote auf große Distanzen „ins Blau“ aufzuklären. Entsprechend sind sie weder ein Ersatz für U-Boot gestütztes, noch für Fregatten/Zerstörer gestütztes ASW, sie sind ein fähigkeitserweiterndes Wirkmittel, dass für eine effektive Nutzung auf den Input besagter Einheiten baut.

Also „keine ASW-Fregatten, stattdessen MPAs“ is nich.