Russland vs. Ukraine

[EuropeanMind]

RUSI hat einen ganz spannenden Bericht veröffentlicht (allerdings auf englisch):

Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo–Ukrainian War
by Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds

Introduction

If a side does not achieve victory within the opening phases of a conflict, protracted
warfare necessitates a continuous process of adaptation and counter-adaptation between the
parties. The Russo–Ukrainian War has been consistent with this trend, such that the
fighting in the first, second and third years of the war saw substantial changes in the
composition of forces, equipment, tactics and relative competitive advantages of the
combatants. The first year of the war was characterised by comparatively small groupings
of well-equipped forces resulting in a mobile conflict. The second year saw the
consolidation of areas of control and deliberate attempts to breach the line of contact, first
by Russia and then by Ukraine. The third year was highly attritional, with the focus of both
parties being the infliction of maximum damage on one another, rather than breakthrough.
The available technology with which the war has been waged has also evolved over this
period.

The authors of this paper have worked in Ukraine throughout the conflict, and documented
the character of the fighting at intervals, noting tactical developments and their operational
implications for Ukraine, for support provided by Ukraine’s international partners, and for
training and equipment programmes among NATO forces. This report builds on this work,
providing an overview of tactical developments as they stand in February 2025 as the war
enters its fourth year. The purpose of this paper is to describe the systems of fighting
employed by Russian and Ukrainian forces and to identify where changes in how the forces
fight reflect peculiarities of the current situation and where they suggest significant changes
that will endure.

This is not an academic study. This paper constitutes research notes from fieldwork
conducted in November 2024 and January 2025. As this work was written in Ukraine and
under conditions consistent with operational security, it does not engage with wider
commentaries on the current character of the war. That does not suggest any inadequacy in
other studies, and the conclusions and observations in this paper should be read in parallel
with similar work carried out by a range of esteemed colleagues. Please also note that this
paper provides a discussion of tactics and not an assessment as to the likely outcome of
engagements by sector. It does not set out to make predictions.

Full download here: https://static.rusi.org/tactical-develop...y-2205.pdf