Sechster Nahostkrieg

[Quintus Fabius]

Aktueller Stand:

Über 700 Tote Israelis (und ausländische Staatsangehörige), über 2500 Verletzte, es wurden vermutlich 100 bis 200 Israelis (und ausländische Staatsangehörige) lebend als Geiseln in den Gazastreifen verschleppt.

Unter den Geiseln sind anscheinend/eventuell auch US Amerikaner:

https://twitter.com/willcain/status/1711008753837801946

Die IDF hat die Lage im Grenzbereich in Israel selbst immer noch nicht unter Kontrolle.

Erste Manöverkritik dazu aus Israel selbst:

https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023...dd0bb80000

Six Significant Failures That Lead to One Point: Collapse vs. Hamas

Israel had no prior intelligence warning of the invasion, and even after it began, there weren’t enough available forces in the field who could arrive at the locales under attack. Even after forces were streamed into the area, many of the troops, including elite forces, waited for long hours at the gathering points rather than be sent into the locales. These are six main failures.

No intelligence warning

The IDF and Shin Bet had no intelligence warning to indicate Hamas’ intention of invading Israel in large numbers. The Southern Command even allowed the transfer to the West Bank of three battalions who operated in the sector, in order to reinforce the troops there over the holiday. The decision was made, among other reasons, due to many incidents which exacerbated security tensions in the West Bank lately, including a prayer held by settlers in Hawara.

The IDF took a long time to realize the magnitude of the event

In addition to the lack of prior information, the IDF took a long time to realize the magnitude of the event even after it began. The military didn’t realize at first that there are dozens of terrorists in a large number of locales. When they realized that Hamas had managed to abduct Israeli soldiers and civilians, images and videos of them from Gaza already began to appear on social media. The terrorist incursion from sea was also something the IDF learned about at a late stage of the attack.

Not enough troops in the sector

The defensive array of the Southern Command and the Gaza Regiment collapsed completely on Saturday morning. The IDF didn’t have enough troops in the sector to deploy them in the locales in short order. Residents around the Perimeter area who called for help from their homes went unanswered. Some managed to get through to military figures and request aid, but in most cases there was no one to help.

Faulty troop transport preparations

At a certain point the IDF began to send a stream of battalions and elite units to help locate and kill the terrorists, but did not prepare appropriately in terms of troop transport. Despite thousands of regular and reserve forces being summoned urgently, the military didn’t prepare with organized buses to take the soldiers to the gathering points. Thus, for long hours, troops awaited rides to take them to the Gaza Perimeter and their units. In most cases they had to use the help of family or friends in order to make it.

Hours-long waits at the gathering points

Even after arrival at the gathering points, many of the fighters waited there for many hours (mostly in parking lots or gas stations), even though it was already known that terrorists had penetrated locales in the area. In many points in the Perimeter, troops not belonging to the same unit organized as a force ad-hoc onsite, under a commander present. Thus, commanders led troops into battle in defense of residential communities, without knowing the soldiers on the mission with them.

It is unclear why the IDF chose to leave large and select forces for hours, at points far from the locales under attack, rather than introduce them to the scene as soon as possible.