Militärische Lehren aus dem Ukraine-Krieg

[Quintus Fabius]

Über das Artillerie-Duell in der Ukraine, in welchem die Raketenartillerie (und dies trotz der Reichweitenbegrenzungen für die Raketen) und - für manche vielleicht etwas überraschend vor allem auch die leichte Artillerie am besten abschneidet :

https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper...e7e0c26f19

To date, Ukraine has received at least 390 pieces of towed artillery and 440 self-propelled guns. NATO’s “big guns” have performed well in Ukrainian hands, but they are suffering heavy losses to Russian action.

Ukraine’s loss rates are brutal. Of the approximately 152 big M777 155mm towed howitzers that “officially” arrived in Ukraine, over a third have already been damaged or destroyed.

Russia is also hitting old-school self-propelled artillery systems—guns that can move about under their own power. Both the AHS Krab, a Polish-designed South Korean and British hybrid gun system, and America’s functional equivalent, the hard-working M-109 mobile howitzer, are getting hit rather hard, with loss rates ranging somewhere between eighteen to twenty-one percent. With over 180 delivered, at least 36 have been damaged or destroyed.

Again, imagery of successful Russian strikes suggests roughly half the destroyed mobile howitzers were caught in static firing points or had set into a pattern, operating from detectable positions.

Smaller, More Mobile Platforms Are Staying Alive:

Thus far, at least 166 105mm towed artillery pieces have arrived in Ukraine. Of the array of British L118/119s, U.S.-built M101s and M119s, along with some OTO Melara Mod 56 105mm howitzers, open-source researchers have only confirmed damage to a single 105mm gun.

This lower loss rate may reflect the smaller platform’s relative mobility as well as their proximity to the front line.

Mit einer Ausnahme:

The French-built truck-mounted CAESAR 155mm gun has also done well in Ukraine. About 49 of these fast-moving, mobile guns are in Ukrainian service. And while the howitzers have been intensively used, they seem hard for Russia to catch. Open-source researchers have reported only two hits.

Mobility Is Life:

Given Ukraine’s massive losses of heavy towed 155mm guns, future Ukraine aid should focus on ensuring Ukraine retains sufficient mobility assets and enough fresh gun crews to keep their precious 155mm howitzers moving around the battlefield. If open-source data reflects a real trend, understanding the difference in loss-rates between the smaller 105mm gun and the big howitzers is important.

Mobility, of course, isn’t the only answer. Going forward, fancy technology and other efforts to block and jam Russia’s array of reconnaissance attack-drones will be critical. But the basics matter. The pattens seem clear: The more Ukraine’s high-value gear moves—and the more it moves in unpredictable patterns—the harder it is for Russia to hit them.

Auf diversen Telegram Kanälen habe ich zudem immer wieder erstaunt zur Kenntnis nehmen müssen, dass die Verlustraten bei Mörsern ebenfalls vergleichsweise gering sind. Wenn man hierzu noch moderne Mörser mit gezogenen Läufen, moderne reichweitengesteigerte Munition (ACERM et al) und die höhere Mobilität der Mörser mit in die Rechnung aufnimmt, stellt sich mir die Frage, was für Systeme in Zukunft den Gros des indirekten Feuers stellen sollen.