(Europa) Streitkräfte der russischen Föderation

[Quintus Fabius]

Hier noch eine Zusammenstellung zur Kampfkraft der russischen Armee:

<!-- m --><a class="postlink" href="https://www.academia.edu/5407818/2013_The_Military_Capability_of_Russias_Armed_Forces_in_2013_in_Hedenskog_and_Vendil_Pallin_eds_Russian_Military_Capability_in_A_Ten-Year_Perspective">https://www.academia.edu/5407818/2013_T ... erspective</a><!-- m -->

he ambition of the political leadership to strengthen Russian military capability has already resulted in visible improvements. Te on-going reformation and the increased defence spending have led to a greater share of the military resources – in the form of organization, personnel and equipment – being readily available. According to the analysis above, Russia possesses sizeable military assets, as outlined on Map 2.5, p. 63. Te increased level and scope of military exercises in the past few years, has improved the capability of the units. aken together, this allows for a sizeable military capability in 2013. Given the size of Russia, the force disposition reflects a defensive posture.

In 2013, the Armed Forces can assemble assets for launching a ground force operation equalling up to a four-brigade-size army plus an airborne brigade in any strategic direction within a week. Within a month, Ground Forces equalling up to another army and an airborne division can be available

A limiting factor for the regular warfare capability is the low level of ability to sustain operations, given the problems associated with the Logistics and Rear Service.

Te manning principle for the Armed Forces’ standing organisation remains a hybrid, combining serving and de facto mobilisation personnel. Manning levels in 2013 result in roughly two thirds of the standing units being available for operations within a month. Te manning levels in the standing units will be decisive for the future availability of units within the one-week and one-month perspectives. Te ratio of officers, NCOs, contract-employed soldiers and conscripts within the units will affect war-fighting capabilities and mobility. Furthermore, the evolution of a reserve mobilisation-based organisation will affect capability in the six-month perspective.

If Russia intends to acquire a wider spectrum of high-technology warfare capabilities, a substantial share of the current weapons and support systems needs to be modernised. Russia’s defence spending and defence industry development will be the limiting factors.

Strategic mobility of the Ground Forces depends on the railways. Increased mobility to enable more efficient use of existing assets across Russia would require sizeable investments from both within and outside the MoD

As a consequence of these limitations, strategic and sub-strategic nuclear weapons continue to play a vital role in strategic deterrence, both against other nuclear powers and against a conventional attack by a numerically or technologically superior enemy. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons also continue to have a significant role in high- to medium-intensive regular warfare in regional wars, including stand-off warfare.