(11.04.2022, 14:10)Pmichael schrieb: Selbst die Finnen teilen deine Meinung wie eine Herr aufgebaut sein sollte nicht, die entsprechenden Beschaffungsmaßnahmen und die internationalen Manövers die man abhält sprechen da eine klare Sprache.

(11.04.2022, 17:50)Broensen schrieb: Das liegt aber eher daran, dass man auf internationaler Ebene mitspielen will, also sich an Out-Of-Area-Einsätzen beteiligen etc. Daher auch die übergroßen neuen Korvetten. Das ändert nichts am grundlegenden LV-Verständnis, sondern soll zusätzlich im IKM-Bereich befähigen.

Zitat:Beware of Potemkin: Germany’s Defense Rethink Risks Reinforcing Old Habits

Germany’s allies had heavily criticized Germany for years and in the run-up to this turn of events for not spending enough on defense, refusing to deliver weapons to Ukraine, and even prohibiting the export of former German weapons to Ukraine by allies (Estonia). However, changing mindsets, processes, and institutions is more difficult than delivering speeches in parliament. Based on early indicators, we are skeptical that the change will be as historical as the speech itself.

So, are we witnessing a turning point, or a largely symbolic and very costly expression of solidarity? A true watershed moment would see Germany embark on strategic disentanglement by departing from previous habits. Interested observers should thus scrutinize future actions concerning how Germany thinks about, decides, and executes its defense policy. Below we propose several indicators to assess the depth of policy change.

A Tamed Strategic Mindset

Currently most of the German defense establishment falls back to its “default mode” when it comes to strategies and concepts. Its security and defense policies are so deeply embedded in the respective NATO and E.U. frameworks that Germany’s dedicated national strategic goals are often difficult to decipher. Unsurprisingly, the government relies on tried and tested narratives — such as increased support for NATO allies and incrementally more punishing sanctions for Russia — in times of immediate crisis. Increased troop deployments to its eastern NATO allies, for example, follow the same reassurance pattern as 2014/2015. Another example is the current German debate on the acquisition of missile defense systems — weapon systems as defensive as they get — instead of talking about the need for more long-range strike capabilities. Diverging from such rehearsed behavior requires more appetite for risk on the part of German politicians.

Where’s the Policy Consensus?

If the current governing coalition wants to spend 2 percent of Germany’s GDP on defense, its multi-year financial plan doesn’t show it. In it, the regular defense budget remains flat at €50.1 billion until 2026. If the €100 billion fund is used to pay the difference, it will already be gone by 2025.

It appears that the current government wants to boost its political credibility in the short term while offloading the real problems onto the next government. These problems include the detrimental effects of massive short-term spending and the foreseeable difficulties of raising the regular defense budget due to the constitutional “debt brake.” On the other hand, procurement logic prefers longer timelines of about 10 years. Yet criticism of the €100 billion special fund doesn’t end there: Its buying power is already diminished as Value Added Tax of 19 percent applies, leaving only €84 billion for actual procurement. Moreover, compared to the approximately €30 billion investment share that Germany’s regular defense budget would have if the country were already spending 2 percent of its GDP on defense, the €100 billion special fund seems more like a public relations stunt in line with what other allied governments regularly do.

Executing: Walk the Talk

Currently, the lack of precise and actionable political guidance is hampering action to reform the most crucial stumbling block of efficient and effective armament procurement: the Bundeswehr’s procurement agency. Risk-averse bureaucrats, prolonged lawsuit-heavy procurement processes, indecision and incoherent signaling on the political level, massive delays in industrial delivery, excessive cost overruns, equipment without promised features, the low quality of delivered equipment, and the need for the defense industry to fully comply with criteria based on civilian safety requirements are the most common complaints.

Although important, spending more on defense is not enough. For Scholz’s Zeitenwende to deliver true change, Germany needs to spend differently and embed the spending hike in a broader national and international context.

Wait, See, and Hope

At first sight, the announcements of Scholz and his government seemed to break the chains that have bound German security and defense policy for too long. Although changing rhetoric is welcome, the true challenge lies in “walking the talk” and engaging in comprehensive cultural, strategic, organizational, and material transformation. Past decisions, however, have created long-term path dependencies that are likely to weaken the necessary change that Scholz sought to evoke. It is too early to tell whether his Feb. 27 speech will mark a true Zeitenwende or whether inducing lasting and profound change will prove too difficult. If and to what extent the benchmarks we have discussed will be addressed determines whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has “wakened a sleeping giant” or just let it construct impressive Potemkin facades without substance behind them — ready to call for the next new revolutionary change a couple of wasted years down the road.

(20.04.2022, 13:42)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Die SPD will das Sondervermögen nun doch nicht nur für die Bundeswehr ausgeben.

Zitat:Ich habe bisher noch nirgendwo eine klare Aussage eines Regierungsvertreters dazu vernommen.

Zitat:Hinsichtlich ihrer Oster-Reise nach Sylt droht Christine Lambrecht ein politisches Nachspiel. Laut eines Medienberichts soll der Sohn der Verteidigungsministerin mit in den Urlaub geflogen sein - in einem Regierungshubschrauber. Das ist rechtlich nicht erlaubt.

Zitat:Wie der Informationsdienst heute im Bundestag (hiB) berichtet, haben die Koalitionsfraktionen zu diesem Einzelplan zunächst keine Änderungsanträge vorgelegt. Änderungsvorschläge der Opposition (u.a. Sperrvermerk für TIGER, CDU/CSU; Erhöhung der Mittel für Materialerhaltung um 1,1 Milliarden Euro und Munitionsbeschaffung auf 1,8 Milliarden Euro, AfD; Streichung von Mitteln für NATO und internationale Einsätze um 860 Millionen Euro, Die Linke) hätten keine Mehrheit gefunden.

(14.05.2022, 18:31)26er schrieb: Nochmals zum Thema Sondervermögen:

Die vergangenen zweieinhalb Monate haben aber auch gezeigt, dass das alles nicht reichen wird. Die Zahl 100 Milliarden wurde Medienberichten zufolge aus der Schublade geholt und basierte auf einer Fähigkeitsforderung der Streitkräfte aus dem abgelaufenen Jahr.

[...]

Das heißt somit: Das Sondervermögen müsste eigentlich nochmal aufgestockt werden, wenn die Bundeswehr notwendige Fähigkeiten im geplanten Umfang zurückgewinnen und neue dazubekommen soll.