(22.05.2022, 21:13)Quintus Fabius schrieb: totalen Krieg.

(22.05.2022, 21:50)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Es spielt gar keine Rolle was die Ukraine akzeptiert oder nicht, was die Ukraine will oder nicht. Es zählt nur was Russland bzw. der Westen TM wollen und akzeptieren und wie weit diese beiden Seiten bereit sind dafür zu gehen. Ohne die USA und den Westen TM ist die Ukraine nichts. Sie wäre bereits jetzt vollständig geschlagen. Der Status Quo ist im weiteren je nach Akteur und dessen Motiven überaus akzeptabel.

(22.05.2022, 22:14)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Den die Versenkung der russischen Flotte wird die Blockade eben nicht brechen und die Russen können selbst ohne Schiffe und ohne eine Besetzung der Schwarzmeerküste die Ukraine jederzeit dauerhaft vom Meer abschneiden. So einfach ist das.

(22.05.2022, 22:14)Quintus Fabius schrieb: könnten die Russen weiterhin aus der Luft

Zitat:Ukraine War Report Canada sending M982"Excalibur" extended range GPS-guided 155mm artillery shells to Ukraine.

Zitat:So far OSINT points to the LMM Martlet MANPADS to be the most consistent killer of Russian Orlan-10 drones.

Every Ukrainian M777 towed gun battery needs a team armed with one of these to cover them👇1/

Die LMM ist übrigens genau der Raketenwerfer welchen ich zur Zeit immer als primären Raketenwerfer für jedwede Infanterie vorschlagen, weil die Befähigung Luftziele zu bekämpfen einfach viel wesentlicher ist als die Befähigung als Infanterie schultergestützt irgendwelche Kampfpanzer zu bekämpfen (weil sowieso sinnlos).

There is a good reason for my statement, which you can see in this video.

Not long after the Ukrainian M777 opened fire, a Russian Orlan-10 showed up and vectored in a loitering munition faster than Russian centralized...
2/

...fire direction could clear a MLRS volley.

Ukrainian SIGINT of in the clear Russian voice calls indicates it takes 40 minutes for the Russians to process a call for fire.

This compares with 1 hour for the US Army Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) plus
3/

Die Russen sind also 20 min schneller !

...JAG officer laws of war deconfliction system.

Yes, the centralized Russian artillery is 20 minutes faster than the US Army artillery because the latter is lawyer ridden.

Any serious peer-to-peer combat will see JAG officers removed from US artillery fires chain of command
4/

Zweifelhaft, so ritualisiert wie unsere Kriegsführung ist.

Both US/Russ systems are slow compared to about three minutes plus time of flight for Ukraine's Kropyva artillery control system.

Which is a distributed processing control system that populates the GNSS target coordinates across a common digital map space. This reduces
5/

...signals density of Ukrainian artillery versus Russian radio direction finding.

The importance of the Orlan-10 in the Russian centralized artillery fire control can be seen in this infographic.
6/

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1528124841014054913/photo/1

There is a nice dashed line between Russian counter battery radars and drones in that infographic.

Which means any of the eight Russian drones you see depicted below can be moved from a nearby parking orbit onto the coordinates given by the radar.👇
7/

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1528124846269505536/photo/1

Exact coordinates are important as drone sensors at altitude can only see a very small patch at high resolution.

This is why battery shoots are more vulnerable than single guns to drone surveillance because a formation of vehicles & guns are easier for low res/wide scans
8/

..to find.

That Russian drone was flying directly over the the M777 155mm gun for a reason.

It was generating a GPS/GNSS coordinate for that loitering munition drone and a Russian MLRS battery.

See upper right in the infographic.
9/

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1528124852267274245/photo/1

There are a few general observations which can be drawn from that video.

First, any artillery battery that shoots together has to be a combined arms unit with early warning, soft & hard kill anti-drone systems. Firing shells is a bigger tell than radio signals in terms of
10/

Oder wie ich es immer schon nenne: Luftabwehr-Artillerie (LART). Luftraumverteidigung und Artillerie müssen in ein und derselben Einheit zusammen gefasst werden. Das macht auch noch aus vielen anderen Gründen Sinn.

...where an artillery battery is.

Second, shoot and shoot is survival. And the time from firing to displacing 400 meters is five minutes versus a modern 21st century distributed processing artillery fire direction system.

Third, even if you 'shoot and scoot,' drones will come hunting your artillery from your last firing position.

This makes wheeled vehicles superior to tracked because there are more wheeled vehicle tracks in rear areas than tracked AFV's.
12/

Dazu sollte man noch anmerken, dass Drohnen vor allem auch die Spuren von Kettenfahrzeugen verfolgen. Kettenspuren = interessantes Ziel = also folgt man einfach den Spuren im Boden zum Ziel per Drohne

Eine wesentliche Forderung daraus sollte sein, den Bodendruck von Kettenfahrzeugen so niedrig wie möglich zu bringen um Spuren zu reduzieren. Das spricht für leichte Hägglungs-Artige Systeme

Plus wheeled self-propelled guns can merge into tactical truck convoys such that stand-off radars like JSTARS cannot pick them out like a Pzh2000 or M109A7 tracked SP gun can be.
13/

Das französische System CAESAR soll hier besonders schwer auszumachen sein und ganz allgemein sind 6x6 hier wesentlich schlechter ausmachbar als 8x8.

Fourth & finally, distributed processing artillery fire direction built around a common geospatial digital map and GPS/GNSS targeting is showing the huge centralized command and control systems built since WW2 to be obsolete.
14/

Centralized artillery command and control along with its battlefield 'deconfliction negotiations' with seperate centralized command & control fixed and rotary wing airpower simply is not competitive on the 21s century battlefield.

Dezentralisierung, und in naher Zukunft auch Vollautonome Systeme. Vollautonome roboterisierte Kriegsführung darf man nicht auf Drohnen beschränkt sehen. Gerade die Artillerie würde sich dafür anbieten !!

Ukraine, without lots of fixed & rotary wing airpower, nor multi-million dollar 'gold plated' drones is simply in a much better position to take the risk using distributed processing fire direction for the combat advantage of time.

Existential threats do that.
16/

The utter combat advantage of time that distributed processing fire direction brings in the 21st century will require the abandonment of 80 years of multiple - & now redundant - centralized command 'stove pipes' for a common multi domain fires system with no centralized
17/

...review and approval of fires.

This sort of change is revolutionary, not evolutionary.

Only Ukraine's unique lack of resources in terms of competing centralized air/artillery C2 systems in the face of the existential threat of Russia allowed it to make that leap of faith.
18/

The nature of centralized institutions is they always fight to stay in existence, even if their role is no longer relevant.

I fear that nothing short of defeat in peer-to-peer combat followed by a military roles and missions change as radical as the post-WW2 merging of the
19/

..US Departments of War & Navy will allow the American military to adopt something as fundamentally revolutionary as the distributed fires processing & non-centralized fires approval that Ukraine's Kropyva artillery control system grants.

20/End

(23.05.2022, 11:08)Quintus Fabius schrieb: In Kasachstan und in der Mongolei blüht auch gerade der Handel in Richtung Russland so richtig auf. Und umgekehrt werden die Chinesen insgesamt ihren Energiebedarf nun für längere Zeit deutlich unter Weltmarktpreis einkaufen können.

Zitat:Gesamtkarte:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1528892442791256064/photo/1

1/ Ukrainian TVD, Day 80-88. The past 9 days has seen one of the most fluid periods to date in the Russo-Ukrainian War. The most significant developments have been the surrender of Ukrainian forces in Mariupol & the Russian breakthrough around Popasna.

So weit nichts neues. Viel relevanter ist die erhebliche Abnutzung der ukrainischen Kräfte im Donbass. Andererseits baut die Ukraine aktuell erhebliche strategische Reserven auf. Nun stellt sich die Frage nach dem Wert besagter Reserven. Klassischen Werken über die Strategie zufolge sollte man den Wert strategischer Reserven nicht überschätzen, weil diese nur in einem bestimmten Kontext und Zeitraum nützlich werden, aber weder davor, noch danach wirklich relevant sind.

2/ Weather Outlook. Forecast for the next 10 days will see reduced cloud cover with little inclement weather; favorable conditions for air & artillery strikes as well as ground assaults. Wind speed and direction will reduce the effectiveness of artillery strikes in general.

Spezifischer noch: sie reduzieren die Leistung der russischen Armee stärker als die der ukrainischen Armee, weil letztgenannte viel mehr gelenkte Munition hat.

Karte Kharkiv:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1528892448042536960/photo/1

3/ Kharkiv OD. The Ukrainian counteroffensive has likely stalled due to recent Russian spoiling attacks in the Ternova & Rubizhne area. Russian forces retain a shallow 10km strip of occupied territory on the border within artillery range of Kharkiv

4/ Russia likely intends to maintain a presence west bank of the Siverskyi Donets rather than use the length of the river as natural obstacle Ukrainian forces must cross. With a bridgehead already over the river at Staryi Saltiv, Ukrainian forces can still threaten Vovchansk.

Das wäre jetzt beispielsweise ein Objektpunkt an dem man möglichst bald eine solche strategische Reserve zum Einsatz bringen müsste.

Karte Severodonetsk-Donetsk:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1528892452307841024/photo/1

5/ Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD. Despite continued heavy losses in the Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD, Russian forces have successfully achieved a localized breakthrough in the Popasna area as well as numerous incremental gains along the Izium & Lyman axes & between Horlivka & Donetsk.

Laut Strelkov ist die Operation in diesem Gebiet ein Disaster, obwohl er zugleich einräumt, dass man hier inzwischen intelligenter vorgeht und anfängt aus seinen Fehlern zu lernen. The Russian Way of War: man lässt einfach alles sterben was nicht funktioniert, und was überlebt sind dann evolutionär in reinstem Darwinismus fähigere Truppen......

6/ The Russian MoD allocated a small operational maneuver group (OMG) of its most capable forces to punch through the secondary Popasna defensive line and exploit this breach toward Soladar in the west and Lysychansik to the north, likely with the intent of forming a cauldron.

7/ Russian forces appear to be leveraging the advantage of Luhansk’s dense rail network to keep forward forces adequately supplied. The OMG in Popasna has made better use of combined arms, a doctrinal approach to breaching prepared defenses, and integrating new combat assets.

Karte Zaporizhzhia OD:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1528892458632851456/photo/1

8/ Zaporizhzhia OD. Russian & Ukrainian activity in the Zaporizhzhia OD has increased over the past week. Between Marinka & Vuhledar Russian units launched a series of assaults that captured a few small towns & villages in the Novomykhaillvka area.

9/ Russian MoD reports that it defeated a counterattack by 2x Ukrainian battalion’s between Hulyaipole & Malynivka on 16 May. Ukrainian sources report an increased presence of Russian troops & equipment in Polohy, likely for a renewed push towards Orikhiv.

Das sind diese Entlastungsangriffe gewesen über welche ich hier schon mal berichtet hatte.

10/ Partisan activity remains active and disruptive in Russian occupied areas, particularly Melitopol & Enerhodar. Russian occupation authorities in Melitopol claim guerillas have attacked artillery & air defense systems throughout the region.

Die Guerilla bleibt aber aktuell immer noch weit unter ihren theoretischen Möglichkeiten. Das kommt aber vielleicht noch. Und umgekehrt arbeiten die Russen anscheinend zur Zeit recht gezielt ihre Todeslisten ab, verschleppen Leute und sind mit Folter und Vernehmungen recht erfolgreich.

Karte Azovstal:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1528892465012363264/photo/1

11/ Azovstal. After 86 days of resistance, Ukrainian forces surrendered to Russian forces in the Azovstal Steel Plant on orders of the Ukrainian Government. Although these troops are meant to be part of a prisoner exchange it is unclear is Russia will honor that commitment.

Meiner Meinung nach (reine Vermutung!) hat die ukrainische Regierung die Situation dort absichtlich herbei geführt und die Truppen dort intentional untergehen lassen. Dazu muss man wissen, dass Zelensky und die dort kämpfenden Einheiten von Azow eine ziemlich negative Beziehung zueinander hatten und haben.

Karte Odeassa / Kherson:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1528892466786496513/photo/1

12/ Odesa-Kherson OD. There has been little combat activity in the Kherson-Odesa OD over the past week. Ukrainian & Russian efforts have mostly focused on improving their tactical positioning. Russian authorities continue to solidify control over the population of Kherson Oblast.

Karte Schwarzes Meer:

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1528892468502351872/photo/1

13/ Black Sea OTMO. The Russian blockade of Odesa continues. The Black Seas Fleet remains active in the western Black Sea to interdict shipping in and out of Odesa, as well as conduct cruise missile strikes against critical Ukrainian infrastructure throughout Ukraine.

14/ Aerospace Assessment. VKS sorties are averaging 250 for a 24-hrs period. Close air support of units operating the Donbas has substantially increased, particularly in the Lyman area. Recent VKS losses include 2x fighter jets (unknown type), 2x helicopters, & 12x UAVs.

Die Zahl der täglichen Einsätze ist derart konstant, dass es wirklich überraschend ist.

15/ Battle Damage Assessment. Anecdotal reporting and generalized statements by Ukrainian/Russian officials of combat losses along the Izium-Lyman-Severdonetsk-Popasna line of operation state a high rate of losses in both troops & equipment among Russian & Ukrainian forces.

16/ Ukrainian TV, Day 80-88. Russia is attempting to place intense pressure on Africa and those parts of Asia that depend on Ukrainian Wheat exports in a likely attempt to force the restart of negotiations. Italy has introduced a 4-point plan to the UN for an end to hostilities.

17/ Humanitarian Impact. Ukrainian refugees total 8.95+ million with 6.79+ million in countries bordering Ukraine, another 2.146+ throughout Europe. Internally displaced people throughout Ukraine remains at 7.6+ million (1.4+ million in east & 519K in south Ukraine).

18/ Info War. Russian authorities & media have been using the surrender of Azovstal to claim the defenders of Mariupol as “fascists” who should be tried for war crimes. This narrative was present during the CSTO meeting to try & illicit military support from its member states.

19/ Information Advantage. The address of Polish President Andrzej Duda during his visit to Kyiv supporting Ukraine’s war aim to liberate all its territory from Russian occupation has wide public support in Western nations, counter to recent suggestion to negotiate a ceasefire.

20/ Overall Assessment. Russia’s push against Severodonetsk will likely determine the success or failure of this current phase of the war. Russian failure to secure the borders of Luhansk & at least make a meaningful advance into Donetsk risks not achieving the Kremlin’s aims.

Wenn dieses offizielle Minimalziel nicht erreicht wird, ist eine Eskalation nicht mehr zu verhindern.

21/ As stated previously, the breakthrough at Popasna has been the result of a better application of doctrinal methodologies and the integration of new combat assets (like BMPT AFV) that has allowed Russian forces to maneuver more effectively and outflank Ukrainian defenses.

22/ Likewise, supporting this has been a missing element of Russian offensive capability, effective supply of sustained combat operations. The Popasna OMG has remained effective largely in part because it has been better supplied than previous Russian offensives.

Zum Verständnis: dort gibt es gleich mehrere Eisenbahnlinien. Während beispielsweise entlang der Operationslinie in Richtung Kiew bei Kriegsbeginn keine Eisenbahnlinien verlaufen sind. Die russische Logistik ist daher überall recht gut, wo es genug Eisenbahnstrecken gibt.

23/ However, the stability of the Russian breakout from Popasna depends on the long-term coherence of this OMGs logistic sustainment. Otherwise it will be unable to make gains for much longer, let alone create a cauldron in Severodonetsk that forces Ukraine forces to withdraw.

Zitat:A few thoughts on the current course of the war and the situation in the Donbas. Recent Russian gains offer a sobering check on expectations for the near term. Will use a few of Nathan’s maps. Thread. 1/

The initial Russian offensive sought to press Slovyansk/Kramatorsk from Izyum, and to envelop Severodonetsk at the same time, severing the two sectors from each other. This was not an attempt at a big operational envelopment in the Donbas, but nonetheless ambitious. 2/

Having been blocked south of Izyum, the thrust of the offensive shifted to Severodonetsk, where Russian forces hoped to achieve an encirclement. Izyum now seems to be a fixing action, designed to prevent UKR from moving substantial forces towards Severodonetsk. 3/

UKR successfully pushed Russian artillery away from Kharkiv, but Russian forces still hold a narrow strip of territory north of the city. That said, it is not clear that the UKR offensive in the north has the forces or momentum to threaten flow of Russian supplies to Izyum. 4/

Russian forces have broken through further south at Popasna. This now threatens to sever Sevorodonetsk/Lysychansk and create a pocket. UKR forces also conducted tactical retreats further south at Svitlodarsk. The Russian mil seems to be pushing towards Soledar. (Nathan's map) 5/

The extent to which this breakthrough at Popasna threatens Ukraine's overall position depends on whether or not Russian forces gain momentum. That in turn hinges on force availability, reserves, and logistics to support this advance. 6/

Russian forces have also begun encircling Lyman, and supposedly entered the city, which suggests they will probably consolidate control of terrain north of the Donets river. Meanwhile UKR forces will move to secondary defensive lines. 7/

@JominiW has good details on the recent movements, I will instead focus on the broader picture. I don't think the Russian offensive looks stalled, and while sluggish, there is no good way to predict when it will culminate. This is why I often say that outcomes are contingent. 8/

Recent Russian gains in the Donbas, despite a relatively weak military advantage, suggest that UKR forces have suffered significant attrition. Zelensky mentioned a range of 50-100 KIA per day. This is a high casualty rate. 9/

The overall military balance in this war still trends in Ukraine's favor, given manpower availability and access to extensive Western military support. That will show itself more over time. But the local balance in the Donbas during this phase is a different story. 10/

There are rumors that UKR is bringing in reinforcements to prevent a larger Russian breakout. Either way, the fight in the Donbas is much less significant for UKR than it is for Russia. If it must, Ukraine can trade territory for attrition, then hope to retake it later. 11/

Despite high Russian losses (I previously suggested 10-12k KIA), and issues with morale, the Russian military appears unlikely to easily give up terrain. Russian mil is also using fires more effectively, and to an extent has adapted, despite observable tactical failures. 12/

I think we shouldn't overstate the significance of the Russian breakthrough at Popasna, but also consider the implications. Are UKR forces going to be in position to conduct a major counteroffensive in the near term, or will both sides face a degree of exhaustion? 13/

Russian forces west of Kherson have also used the past few weeks to dig in and fortify their positions. They're not going to give up territory easily even in areas where they're at a relative disadvantage. 14/

Russian forces may not be prosecuting offensives with much enthusiasm, but it is equally difficult to expect them to rout or melt away. Similarly, the situation within Ukraine's army remains a major unknown, but it is clear the war is taking its toll. 15/

The battlefield is likely to stay dynamic, with territory changing control via advances and counter attacks. I doubt we will see a stalemate emerge, but rather operational pauses that folks will be tempted to declare a stalemate. 16/

In my view it is too early to make predictions on how the battle for the Donbas will go. Ukraine may lose territory in the short term, but Russia faces major problems with sustaining its military effort in the long term, or holding on to gains. The war could become protracted.

Will add, this is why I often refrain that it is difficult to tell where you are in a war. Big turning points are easiest to discern in hindsight. In the present many tactical events seem to take on outsized significance.

Zitat:Despite high Russian losses (I previously suggested 10-12k KIA), and issues with morale, the Russian military appears unlikely to easily give up terrain. Russian mil is also using fires more effectively, and to an extent has adapted, despite observable tactical failures. 12/