Zitat:Die Saqr-1 (oder von den USA als "Missile 358" bezeichnet) dürfte wie andere Drohnen jemenitisch-iranischer Baureihen vergleichsweise günstig sein. Sicher kein 6-stelliger Betrag.

Zitat:a Ukrainian activist and three soldiers said the Iranian drones pose a major threat to both fighters and civilians. Their arrival on the battlefield makes the need for the West to send additional modern weaponry even more urgent, as Kyiv tries to seize on recent gains to retake as much territory as possible before winter sets in, they said.

The Iranian drones appear to be a potential game-changer for the Russians. They are relatively small and fly at low altitude, evading Ukrainian radars. Arekhta said she could shoot them down with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, but only during the day because the U.S.-provided weapons do not come with a night-vision system.

Zitat:Andriana Arekhta, a junior sergeant with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, said the drones flew from Crimea to attack her special forces unit fighting near the southern city of Kherson. The drones evaded the soldiers’ defenses and dropped bombs on their position, destroying two tanks with their crews inside.

“It’s very difficult to see these drones on radars,” said Arekhta

Zitat:“It’s very difficult to see these drones on radars,” said Arekhta

Zitat:Light Vehicles Bristling With Suicide Drones Were Trending At This Year’s Army Convention

New configurations from AM General and Fly Defender underscore growing interest in vehicles capable of deploying swarms of loitering munitions.

Zitat:Russia is notably lagging behind in the development and production of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). Its attempts to catch up have included weaponising the Forpost UAV, which is a licensed copy of the Israeli IAI Searcher, and designing an indigenous UCAV known as the Kronshtadt Orion. Several more advanced UCAV designs are also in the pipeline, including Sukhoi's Okhotnik-B, and Kronshtadt's Sirius and Grom projects. The future of these systems, already in some doubt due to a lack of access to certain key technologies, will be even more so now that Russia finds itself buckling under the weight of international sanctions. Regardless of the continued course of their development, it is certain that Russia has all but missed the boat when it comes to cashing in on the worldwide drone revolution.

Zitat:The State Bureau of Investigation in Ukraine has said MiG-29’s pilot was forced to eject from his fighter after damage by shrapnel after the blow-up of Shahed-136 “kamikaze” drone.

Ukrainian Air Force MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter jet crashed after being scrambled to intercept Russia’s Iranian-made Shahed-136 kamikaze drones in the Vinnytsia region on 12 October.

Zitat:Ukraine conflict: ‘Drones' engage in first recorded unmanned aerial combat

Unmanned systems have engaged each other in combat for the first time, footage released from Ukraine appears to show. A 16 second clip of two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or ‘drones' as they are colloquially known, duelling in the skies of the Ukrainian battlefield marks the first time that an engagement entirely between unmanned systems has been recorded not just in that conflict, but in the history of warfare.

The footage shows the engagement from the onboard camera of one of the two protagonists. Identified on social media as being a Ukrainian UAV spotting for artillery, this ‘drone' is approached by what is reported to be a Russian quadcopter that manoeuvres around it before seemingly purposefully crashing into it with a view to take it out of the sky. As seen in the clip, it is the quadcopter that actually comes to grief, its rotor blades snapping before crashing to the ground.

Zitat:Shahed-136 munitions are so cheap compared to AA-missiles they have priced them out of the war. This is a cost based rate of attrition a SEAD attacker will always win. And this problem is only going to get worse. 1st, Shahed-136 are not top end loitering munitions. Next, they had the Russian Potato level intel/surveillance/Recce (ISR) backing them up with Iranian IRGC instructors doing the targeting.

And they were fired into the densest IADS Ukraine had in Kyiv.

This threat will get orders of magnitude worse with compound helicopter loitering munitions using digital maps and nulling GPS antennas for navigation updates. One of the SEAD guys on my email list said it was "low signature and low altitude" that made Shahed-136 & their ilk

Das kann man nur betonen: solche Systeme werden in Zukunft keine GPS Steuerung mehr haben, sondern sich einfach am Gelände selbst direkt orientieren. Damit entfällt jede Satellitenverbindung die sie benötigen würden.

... so dangerous. I disagreed.

It is less 'low signature" than the best stealth is having a terrain feature between you and an enemy radar. It weighs nothing, costs nothing and works for every frequency other than OTH-B radars, for which they are to small to pick up.

To get that top end 'terrain stealth,' you have to fly at 100-180 kts indicated air speed with satellite radio navigation updates. Shaheds do that and their problem will get worse as time goes on as cheaper IT lets digital maps with IADS information get programmed

...into them. And eventually, live updates are transmitted as they heading for their targets. At $20K a pop, you can afford to fire 50 so 8 get through, while the other 42 eat AA-missiles in the SEAD role. And these things are turning into compound helicopters so they can fly below tree lines when they get close to the target. The nature of what constitutes airpower has radically changed. IADS need to match this change by looking to its WW2 past.

What 21st century air defenses need are the WW2 levels of gun based "Daka" similar to at Antwerp versus the V-1 buzz bomb to deal with Shahed-136. IOW, you need dirt cheap weapons like guns because only bullets and shells are cheap enough to win at a price you can afford

Und an dieser Stelle muss ich dem Autor wiedersprechen: es wäre noch viel einfacher und eleganter selbst Drohnenschwärme zu haben, die solche angreifenden Drohnen jagen. Man könnte dann das gleiche Basismodell welches man selbst für den Angriff verwendet mit einer leicht anderen Programmierung für due vollautonome Drohnenjagd verwenden.

Dass man zusätzlich mehrgleisig fahren muss, und insbesondere eine Truppengattungsübergreifende Luftraumverteidigung benötigt (Mittelkaliber MK), ist völlig klar. Dessen ungeachtet müssen solche bodengeschützten Systeme mit SMG, Maschinenkanonen usw zum einen bewegt werden - und eigene Drohnen sind hier (Luftlinie) viel schneller, zum anderen ist ihr Sichtbereich beschränkt (LOS), während eigene Drohnen aus der Luft eine viel bessere Aufklärung feindlicher Drohnen gewährleisten können. Entsprechend ist die bodengestützte Luftabwehr hier nur eine Ergänzung

...versus GPS guidance equipped propeller kamikaze drones. The document images in this and the previous tweet popped up from a internet search using "The Defense of Antwerp against the V-1 Missile" as a search term. They teach about gun based air defense w/o fighters

..because the defense of London with crewed fighters and guns showed that the problems of deconflicting gun air defenses from fighters simply was not worth what the fighters provided in terms of V-1 kills. The other lesson learned about the defense of London was it was a really stupid idea to put your gun based defenses inside a dense urban area to shoot at the V-1, because shooting it down dropped a V-1 warhead on London.

Ebenso ist zu bedenken, dass alles was ich nach oben abfeuere auch irgendwo wieder herunter kommt. Eigene Abwehrdrohnen aber, die keine feindliche Drohne treffen gefährden im weiteren nicht nur niemanden, sie können auch noch mal verwendet werden, im Gegensatz zu einer abgefeuerten Granate oder einem abgefeuerten Geschoss, dass dann irgendwo anders einen Zivilisten trifft.


And the reason I believe that is a Ukrainian mistake & not Russian terrorism is the Shahed-136 have proven to be deadly accurate and have hit what it is they are aimed at 17/20 times in Saudi Arabia.

And in Ukraine, as this strike on the Ukrainian power grid control center makes abundantly clear.

What is needed for Ukraine are belts of gun defenses between Shahed-136 launch points and its protected areas, AKA urban areas, and point defenses for the Ukrainian power grid. Accepting that there will be collateral damage from downed drones and AA fire landing in the city.

Für die Ukraine ja, weil sie nicht die technischen Möglichkeiten hat die von mir beschriebenen Abwehrdrohnen vorzuhalten.

The defense of Antwerp in 1944-1945 exemplified these tactics.Deep belts of first ground observers with radar guided search lights, then heavy guns with radar proximity fuzes, then autocannons with their own observers were placed on the approach axis of various Nazi V-1 launch sites.

The fact that Shahed-136 are vulnerable to 5.56mm small arms over Kyiv & Odessa means Ukraine can cobble together AA gun lines with ZSU-23-2 23mm autocannon plus 14.5mm, .50 caliber & 7.62mm in multiple machine gun mounts and give them the same air warning app that let a Ukrainian Army MANPADS team hit a cruise missile from a highrise in Kharkiv during the first month of the war.
This air warning app plus MANPADS kill of a jet powered cruise missile trick has been repeatedly demonstrated since then.

Ein Hagel aus SMG und MG Kugeln über einer Stadt bedeutet allein schon aufgrund der wieder herunter fallenden Geschosse viele Tote. Die ukrainischen Apps für Zivilisten um Daten ans Militär weiter zu melden sind aber in jedem Fall sehr gut.

Solche Apps fehlen in Deutschland und es wäre dringend notwendig sie seitens der Bundeswehr bereits in Friedenszeiten zu beschaffen und zu verbreiten.

Depending on how effective the gun lines are, using MANPADS in this way will reduce but not eliminate the SEAD effect of Shahed-136, but it will save Ukrainian lives from AA collateral damage. MANPADS have failed in this role w/o sufficient warning.

For the future, networked air defenses with an eff-ton of A.I. aided acoustic sensors to 'hear the buzz' of those fixed propellers & rotors at low altitude is only one aspect of where IADS are going.

Modern Drone IADS need numbers and those numbers have to be cheap and hey need to be both mobile & persistent mobile in order to mass against swarm attacks.

Exakt so ist es und deshalb:

This means anti-drone drones with high power Traveling Wave Tube or MASER to zorch cheap loitering munition swarms, because a drone can't be small, cheap and low mass.