Zitat:It is 59 days since the Russian invasion of #Ukraine began. Today I will update my analysis of Russia’s shift to the east and examine the prospects for Russian success there. 1/25

2/25 I will conduct my analysis using the construct of ‘fighting power’. This is something we use in the Australian Army to describe the optimal development & combination of the intellectual, physical and moral aspects of war.

3/25 The intellectual component of fighting power is knowledge and it application - of war, warfare, tactics, logistics, command and control. This includes organisational concepts, building a learning culture, adaptation, etc.

4/25 The physical component is a military organisations capabilities and functional effects. This includes equipment, training infrastructure, weapons, ammunition, trucks (HT @TrentTelenko
), personal equipment, sensors, physical comms networks, etc.

5/25 Finally, the moral component is all about culture, values and legitimacy. Importantly, it includes leadership, purpose, and the will to fight of individuals and teams.

6/25 The best military institutions are able to develop each of these components, adapt them based on experience and learning, and combine them in optimal ways (different for every operation) in order to succeed at their missions.

7/25 Key intellectual aspects that the have Russians demonstrated – in the east but throughout their invasion – have included the BTG as the core fighting formation, the ability to use ground and air power (but not well integrated) and to conduct warfare on multiple fronts.

8/25 However, there are many shortfalls in this intellectual component which will tell in their eastern operations. The Russians have not provided suitable logistic support to their combat forces. Nor have they demonstrated the capacity to integrate air and land operations well.

9/25 While some sources have noted additional logistic units deploying to the east, and Russian air sorties have increased, these fall short of a systemic fix. The air and logistic problems weren’t just a quantity issue – they are a systemic problem. These take time to fix.

10/25 Intellectually, the Russians used their combat forces piecemeal, feeding them into the fight slowly rather than generating large, powerful main efforts to achieve not just tactical success, but operational breakthroughs. This has been a significant intellectual failing.

Kann ich so nicht zustimmen. Das hat primär Innen-politische Gründe.

11/25 Their application of combined arms warfare appears to have been sub optimal. Tanks have been employed by themselves without infantry, engineer, artillery support. Once again, this goes against all the lessons of modern combined arms warfare.

An dieser Stelle muss man betonen, dass die BTG eigentlich genau das zur Verfügung stellen soll: und die Befähigung zum Gefecht verbundener Waffen so weit wie möglich nach unten bringen soll.

Es besteht hier also ein signifikanter Unterschied zwischen russischer Theorie und russischer Praxis. Rein theoretische dürften eigentlich überhaupt gar keine russischen Panzer alleine herum fahren, sondern ganz im Gegenteil! Da operieren westliche Panzerkompanien oft theoretisch mehr für sich allein. Theoretisch.

12/25 Their approach to command & control is also a problem in the intellectual domain. Russia's initial approach was to fight 3 separate wars in the north, east & south - & another in the air. Russia seeks to fix this with the appointment of a unified commander – GEN Dvornikov.

14/25 What about the physical component of fighting power? This is a topic that needs to be caveated up front because we don’t have perfect clarity on the size of the opposing forces in the east. So my analysis uses only open source information only.

15/25 Also, there are many who caution against using force ratios as a basis for planning. I understand the reasons for this (I helped rewrite Army doctrine and have been a combat brigade commander). That said, they remain useful rough order of magnitude guides for planning.

16/25 That said, the Russians do not appear to have sufficient mass to achieve a significant breakthrough in the east, despite the indications that they now have upwards of 80 BTGs there. And, as @kofman_michael
notes, because of their losses, it is not clear what a BTG is now.

Tatsächlich sieht man kaum noch richtige BTG und erst recht keine vollständigen. Aktuell agieren da teilweise ganz normale konventionelle - aber ausgeblutete und reduzierte Brigaden bzw. Kampfgruppen.

17/25 Opposing them, there are (according to several sources) up to 15 Ukrainian brigades, each of which has 3-5 combat battalions. This gives them somewhere between 45 and 75 battalion sized organisations opposing the Russians.

Da immer mehr ukrainische Verbände nachgeholt werden können (die Mobilisierung läuft ja aktuell immer weiter), kann man meiner Ansicht nach eher von um die 75 ukrainischen Bataillonen ausgehen.

18/25 In such an operation, the Russians need to deploy forces of at least a 3:1 ratio to the defenders. They don’t come anywhere near this. And, by the way, this assumes Russian attacking forces are well led, supplied & coordinated. As we saw in the north, this is unlikely.

Ein solches Zahlenverhältnis ist auch nur eine Worthülse, einfach nur ein konventioneller Standardgedanke. Man kann als Angreifer sogar in der Unterzahl gewinnen. Dafür bedarf es halb bestimmter Umstände. Diese sind aber für die Russen natürlich bis jetzt nicht gegeben, so weit man das sagen kann. Beispielsweise wäre kein solches Verhältnis notwendig wenn denn die Luftwaffe richtig agieren könnte !

19/25 So, in addition to intellectual shortfalls in their fighting power, the Russians lack the physical wherewithal for significant breakthroughs in the east. While there are things we are not seeing, the ‘Donbas Maths’ don’t work in Russia’s favour for a large-scale offensive.

20/25 Finally, the moral component of fighting power. This includes Russian military culture, leadership and will. As we have seen, the Russian military culture is one that is brutal and representative of their behaviour in WW2, Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria.

Und gerade deshalb im Bereich COIN querschnittlich wesentlich erfolgreicher !

21/25 This military culture, and the atrocious behaviour it spawns, has delegitimised Russian operations (even more than their illegal invasion). It also means they are less effective as a military force, and less capable at achieving difficult military objectives.

22/25 But, perhaps leadership is the area most lacking in the moral component of Russian fighting power. Their strategic leaders planned this war poorly and have incentivised systemic targeting of cities and civilians.

Poorly planned stimmt sicher, aber das Töten von Zivilisten in den zur Zeit auftretenden Größenordnungen ist eigentlich bei einem Krieg dieser Größenordnung gar nicht vermeidbar wenn man ihn den ernsthaft führen will.

23/25 At the tactical level, bad leaders have been responsible for the intellectual failings described earlier in the thread. This is a systemic problem with training, education, and organisational culture. It will not be fixed in the coming weeks.

Das ist es was mich immer noch erstaunt. Der Mangel an handwerklichem Können. Man kann auch mit altem schlechten Material sehr gut umgehen. Ich habe das handwerkliche Können, also die Ausbildung der russischen Soldaten stark überschätzt.

24/25 Taken together, these three elements of Russian fighting power do not appear to support the prospect of any major Russian gains from their eastern offensive. There may be some successes, but there are multiple challenges that suggest things don't bode well for the Russians.

25/25 That does not mean the Russians are not dangerous, or that they won’t hold onto ground already seized in Ukraine. The Ukrainians are also very capable of mounting an offensive in the east. I will explore these topics in threads this week. End

Zitat:The Russo-Ukrainian War at Sea: Retrospect and Prospect

In the first phase of the Russian war on Ukraine, the Russian navy largely succeeded in the basics of establishing a coherent naval strategy. It quickly established command of the sea by keeping Ukrainian ships from sailing. Once control of the waters of the southern coast of Ukraine and the Sea of Azov was established, the Russians began using it for their military purposes by blockading the coast, launching naval bombardments of targets both on the coast and well inland, and by landing boots on the ground with amphibious reinforcements of existing operations. Attempts to resupply Russian forces via the sea have been a mixed bag, with some success and some spectacular failures like the sinking of a Russian amphibious ship pier-side at Berdyansk. But the war on shore has entered a second phase. As Ukraine begins amassing more sophisticated and capable weapons, Russian forces face limitations due to the limited Turkish closure of the Bosporus under the terms of the Montreux Convention. The war at sea can shift as well.

The adoption of the classical methods of coastal defense, through the use of coastal gunnery and strike capabilities, careful employment of mine warfare, and adopting a creative approach to small craft, might allow Ukrainian forces to challenge Russian command of the sea. While they do not need to gain command for themselves, the ability to deny Russia easy and open use of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov could provide Kyiv with major benefits. The stunning sinking of the Moskva may be the turning point: As the Russian warships pull back from the coast to better protect themselves, they open more littoral maneuver space for Ukrainian forces. The adoption of greater coastal defense measures, combined with a limited guerre de razzia strategy that might even put the facilities as Sevastopol at risk, offers a clear naval strategy that will both limit the advantages the Russians established in the early weeks of the war while at the same time giving Ukrainian naval forces the opportunity to impose costs on Russian forces.

Zitat:Die Türkei sperrte vorübergehend den Luftraum für russische Militär- und Zivilflugzeuge, die nach Syrien fliegen. Der russische Präsident Wladimir Putin sei darüber informiert worden, sagte Außenminister Mevlüt Cavusoglu gegenüber türkischen Journalisten bei einer Tournee durch Lateinamerika.

„Wir haben den Luftraum für russische Militär- und sogar Zivilflugzeuge, die nach Syrien fliegen, gesperrt. Wir haben [jedes Mal] eine Genehmigung für drei Monate ausgestellt. Die Genehmigung endete im April. Unser [türkischer Präsident Tayyip Erdogan] hat dies auch [dem russischen Präsidenten Wladimir] Putin gesagt. Danach wurden die Flüge ausgesetzt“, zitierte die Zeitung Sabah Cavusoglu

Zitat:Die Türken sperren ihren Luftraum für die Russen. Das ist interessant und wesentlich für die rusisschen Operationen in Syrien:

(24.04.2022, 14:04)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Im Prinzipg müssten die Russen von Saporischschja in nördlicher Richtung nach Dnipropetrowsk vorstoßen und zugleich von Charkiw nach Süden ebenfalls in Richtung Dnipropetrowsk, dann säßen wesentliche ukrainische Verbände in einem Kessel fest und könnten niedergemacht werden. Dazu müssten die genannten Großstädte gar nicht genommen werden, es würde genügen sie abzustellen. Der ganze Vorstoß liefe von beiden Seiten entlang der E105 und wäre von Straßen wie Gelände her gut machbar und auch versorgbar.

(24.04.2022, 14:04)Quintus Fabius schrieb: Wenn Russland jetzt nicht den Krieg erklärt (ein Casus Belli wird sich schon finden lassen) und die Mobilmachung anordnet, wird dieser Krieg nicht einmal mehr mit begrenzten Zielen gewinnbar sein. Es fehlen einfach die Truppen.

Zitat:Russia also has an estimated 2 million personnel in its military reserves—some of whom have already been deployed to Ukraine—but the Institute for the Study of War notes “few are actively trained or prepared for war,” estimating only 4,000 to 5,000 reserve troops were considered “active” as of 2019.

Zitat:Und dann stellt sich zudem die Frage: Wie schnell kann man seitens Russland die Leute trainieren, damit sie irgendeinen Kampf-Wert haben?

[quote]Russia also has an estimated 2 million personnel in its military reserves—some of whom have already been deployed to Ukraine—but the Institute for the Study of War notes “few are actively trained or prepared for war,” estimating only 4,000 to 5,000 reserve troops were considered “active” as of 2019.

Zitat:With their only engine supplier having stopped the repair and maintenance of their aircraft, several Russian airlines operating the Sukhoi Superjet 100 warn that they may soon need to be grounded.

Zitat:Aus früherem Bundeswehr-Bestand

Regierung gibt "Gepard"-Lieferung an Ukraine frei

Zum Treffen auf der US-Airbase Ramstein kommt Verteidigungsministerin Lambrecht nicht mit leeren Händen. Wie mehrere Medien berichten, gibt die Bundesregierung die Lieferung von "Gepard"-Luftabwehrpanzern an die Ukraine frei. Das schwere Gerät gehörte früher der Bundeswehr. [...]

Krauss-Maffei Wegmann verfügt über eine mittlere zweistellige Zahl dieser Panzer aus der aufgelösten Heeresflugabwehr der Bundeswehr. Der "Gepard" kann auch im Kampf gegen Bodenziele eingesetzt werden. Die Bekämpfung von fliegenden Zielen im Verbund mit anderen Kräften gilt dagegen als technisch deutlich anspruchsvoller. [...]