Zitat:The problem with all the gizmos is the microelectronics. Russian industry generally has been critically dependent on foreign microelectronics and associated technologies. These are no longer available due to sanctions (hence the joke Russian defence’s main supplier has become AliExpress). Captured Russian equipment such as drones reveals components are being sourced from wherever they can be found (including stolen Swedish traffic cameras in the case of the Orlan-10 UAV).

The perennial Russian problem of corruption has only worsened challenges posed by sanctions. The Volgograd Krasny Oktyabr (‘Red October’) plant which makes the armour plates for Russian tanks was declared bankrupt in 2018. Millionaire-owner Dmitry Gerasimenko is on the international wanted list for allegedly embezzling a loan of $65 million and transferring 6.2 billion roubles abroad. Such tales litter Russian industry. Since 2011, a staggering 72,000 officials have appeared before the courts on corruption charges. In 2022 alone (so much for patriotism) 60 defence industry officials and 250 public procurement officials have been prosecuted, 27 of whom were convicted of violations in the implementation of the state defence order.

Zitat:Das führt auch für uns eigentlich zu der Frage, welches technologische Niveau für die reale praktische Kriegsführung ausreichend ist und warum man ein höheres technologisches Niveau bei vielen Systemen überhaupt anstreben sollte ? Gerade bei Panzern stellt sich meiner Meinung nach diese Frage.

Zitat: Das führt auch für uns eigentlich zu der Frage, welches technologische Niveau für die reale praktische Kriegsführung ausreichend ist und warum man ein höheres technologisches Niveau bei vielen Systemen überhaupt anstreben sollte ? Gerade bei Panzern stellt sich meiner Meinung nach diese Frage.

Zitat:Russia’s Military Revival, by Bettina Renz

Published in 2018, Renz provides a comprehensive analysis of the Russian military’s resurgence under Vladimir Putin by examining the history and organization of the Russian military and developments in Russian military thinking. In so doing, she works to contextualize the Russian military’s reform efforts under Putin within Russia’s broader foreign policy objectives and argues that while the Russian military improved greatly from the 1990s, it does not yet rival the West’s capabilities. Her book is a particularly interesting read in light of the war in Ukraine, which, among other issues, begs the question of the degree to which the Russian military was truly revived.

The Transformation of Russia’s Armed Forces: Twenty Lost Years, edited by Roger McDermott

This edited volume, based on a special issue of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, brings together several of the biggest names in Russian military analysis to discuss the challenges facing Russian policymakers as they tried to rebuild the Russian military. This collection highlights the considerations of and complications facing Russian leaders as they sought to build a military capable of defending Russian interests in the twenty-first century. Understanding how the Russian military became what it is today can help us understand where it might go after the war in Ukraine.

Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine, by Mark Galeotti

Published in November 2022, just months after the Russian invasion, this book, tracing the history of the Russian military since the 1990s, provides a thorough (what one reviewer called “encyclopedic”) look at Russia’s hard power. Galeotti’s analysis is remarkably timely, but readers should consider how the war complicates some of his arguments. Nevertheless, this book provides readers with a remarkable level of detail of the Russian military and paints a picture of a political leadership seduced by the perceived success of its military.

The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel, by Dima Adamsky

Soviet military thinkers were among the first to recognize a revolution in military affairs (RMA) based upon the growth and spread of information technologies—and yet, the Soviet military struggled to implement the technological realities of the RMA. In analyzing how three countries—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel—perceived and adapted to the RMA, Adamsky demonstrates that culture impacts the ways in which countries innovate militarily. Adamsky’s theoretical contributions to the understanding of military innovation and culture are noteworthy, and even readers less familiar with academic theory will appreciate what his analysis tells us about the Russian military.

Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts, by Michael Kofman, et al

Michael Kofman, a former MWI fellow, is one of the most prominent voices on analysis of the war in Ukraine. His work on the Russian military is well worth a read, and this monograph by his team at CNA is no exception. The report provides an in-depth look at the way in which Russian military leaders conceive of Russian military strategy, with a thorough overview of how the Russian military plans (or perhaps planned) to fight, focusing on military strategy and operational concepts. As readers may recall, many analysts were surprised that the Russian military did not follow prescribed doctrine during the early stages of the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This report will help readers understand how many analysts expected the Russians to fight and how that differs from practice.

Zitat:RUSSIAN LESSONS LEARNED IN THE WAR
WITH GEORGIA

Despite the fact that the war with Georgia resulted in a victory for Russia, the performance of the Russian military in the war has been the subject of significant discussion and criticism in the almost 2 years
since the war ended. President Dmitri Medvedev himself named five areas of reform that must be emphasized going forward: bringing all combat formations to permanent-readiness status (i.e., elimination
of cadre units); raising the effectiveness of command and control systems; improving the system of officer
training; upgrading equipment with a focus on PGMs; and improving pay, housing, and social amenities for
kontraktniky and officers.83 Approaching the problem from a different level, Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov, former Chief of the Main Combat Training and Service Directorate, identified the key problems
exposed by the war as poor interoperability between the air force and ground forces, poor communications capabilities, and the low resolution of Russian reconnaissance systems, especially UAVs.84 As Mikhail Barabanov, editor and co-author of Tanks of August, noted, Though from the position of unsophisticated extraneous observers one saw a quick, massive and decisive action of the Russian army and successful crushing of the Georgian armed forces, in reality, as became completely clear, the experience of the utilization of the Russian armed forces in conflict was considered sufficiently contradictory by the political-military leadership of the RF, which led in the end to a new
stage of radical military reform, the one which has as its goal bringing the armed forces of the country to a
“new look,” oriented, first of all, towards participation in local conflicts in the territory of the former USSR. An adviser to the Minister of Defense of Russia told Dr. Cohen that the war confirmed that Russia needs to spend most of its efforts and procurement funds on building a smaller, more maneuverable, and
rapidly deployable army to defend its borders, not fight a world war. “This is where the money goes, de-
spite losing over 50 percent of the budget to graft.” Finally, Russian military analysts have concluded that
although the war validated the concept of joint operations, it also demonstrated that the Russian armed
forces have a long way to go before they are capable of operating in a truly joint manner. Readiness was a major issue as well—a survey of the Russian military completed after the war showed that only 17 percent of army units and 5 out of 150 air force regiments were combat-ready. Thus, the requirements for reform dictated by Russian performance in the war with Georgia are ample and fundamental, and seem to be acknowledged by both the political and military leadership of the country.

Zitat:Dimitri Minic is a Research Fellow at Russia/Eurasia Center of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), where his research deals with Russian Armed Forces and strategic thought. He holds a Ph.D. in History of International Relations from the Sorbonne University and obtained funding for his thesis from the Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS) and the Institute for Strategic Research at the Military School (IRSEM) of the French Ministry of Armed Forces. He has just published the book based on his PhD thesis, entitled Russian Strategic Thought and Culture: From the Bypassing of Armed Struggle to the War in Ukraine.

Zitat:Dimitri Minic: 'The Russian army is influenced by beliefs that detaches it from objective reality'

According to the researcher, the failure of the Russian army in Ukraine is the result of the implementation of a theory that emerged in the 2000s, which places a central focus on 'psychological-informational' warfare rather than armed combat.

Zitat:Implications for the War in Ukraine and Beyond

We are witnessing the maturation of deep-attack capabilities that were developed during the 1970s and 1980s. As Soviet/Russian military theorists have long understood, these advancements in weapons and sensor technology, over the course of several decades, have made large troop concentrations extremely vulnerable. Additionally, although this has not led to the removal of terms such as FLOT (forward line of own troops), FLET (forward line of enemy troops), and FEBA (forward edge of battle area) from the military lexicon, targets are now being struck throughout the entire depth of the front and beyond. These theorists also recognized at an early stage that there are two possible military solutions to counter this. The first is by improving the effectiveness of their own reconnaissance-fire and reconnaissance-strike complexes, in order to degrade the opponent’s deep-attack capabilities. The second is by dispersing formations on the battlefield in order to increase survivability.

However, current battlefield conditions are adding the related difficulty of achieving the concentration of forces necessary for establishing main efforts during offensive operations. This is reducing large-scale engagements and thereby necessitating a concentration and synchronization of effects, rather than a traditional physical massing of troops. In turn, this places an extra burden on command and control, especially when contested by electronic warfare. Only by disrupting the opponent’s kill chain can larger formations regain the ability to concentrate and engage in maneuver warfare. During the war in Ukraine, superiority in kill-chain effectiveness has become one of the prime objectives for both sides. In this war and any other characterized by the same dynamics, this superiority becomes an essential condition for victory.